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Authors’ Preface 
 
We had close visibility to two important generic photovoltaic technologies at particularly 
revealing stages of development, i.e., the stages between R&D and stable commercial 
production and profitable sales.   
 
After considering and incorporating comments on our original draft, we feel the need to 
be very clear about what this report attempts and what it does not attempt.  Based on two 
historical cases, it attempts to shed light on the difference between:  1) costs and 
schedules validated by actual manufacturing and market experience, and 2) estimated 
costs and schedules that rely on technology forecasts and engineering estimates.  The 
amorphous Silicon case also identifies some of the costs that are incurred in meeting 
specific market requirements, while the Cadmium Telluride case identifies many of the 
operational challenges involved in transferring R&D results to production.   
 
We do not claim that the experience reported is typical of what may be expected in other 
cases of thin-film PV commercialization.  Nevertheless, it may be illuminating in general 
terms, i.e. costs and timescales involved in replicating favorable R&D results in the much 
more demanding context of commercial production.  The problems we encountered may 
not be unique to the cases we discuss; they may be relevant to parallel and future efforts.  
Some in fact are generic concerns, e.g. the problems of scaling from R&D results to 
larger area products in high volume production.  Likewise, managing the interplay 
between markets, technology and manufacturing is a challenge every new PV enterprise 
must face, and the challenge is compounded by inherent differences between incumbent 
products and new offerings.  Other problems probably were unique, e.g. some specific 
product finishing costs dictated by emerging and innovative market applications.   
 
We were not tasked to present a management case study.  It is impossible to illuminate all 
of the considerations that enter into investment and operational decisions in a competitive 
environment.  We caution against inferring that easy choices were missed.  We know of 
none.   
 
The transition between R&D and commercial success takes a great deal of time and 
money for emerging energy conversion technologies in general.  The experience we 
report can be instructive to those managing comparable efforts, and to their investors.  It 
can also be instructive to R&D managers responsible for positioning such new 
technologies for commercial success via the U.S. Department of Energy Solar 
Technology program.  We commend Dr. Robert Margolis’ recognition of the latter 
opportunity, and we appreciate reviewer comments that led to clarifications and 
improvements in our report.   
 
Gerry Braun and Doug Skinner 
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Executive Summary 
 
At the end of 2002, a first-tier PV module manufacturer, BP Solar, announced its 
decision to abandon two leading thin-film PV manufacturing scale-up and 
commercialization efforts.  These intensive efforts spanned a decade and were the 
culmination of private-sector R&D investments totaling a few hundred million dollars 
during the prior decade.  Combined capital expenditures approached 100 million (2005) 
dollars and were supported by significant U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) R&D expenditures.  In both cases, hard 
challenges were met – and a wealth of experience was gained.   
 
In late 2004, a study was commissioned to review what was learned specifically about 
cost, i.e. to:   
• Identify real-world cost models that can be used to evaluate comparable emerging 
technologies  
• Identify decisions and cost drivers that may be influential in other cases  
• Understand the reasons actual product costs may have exceeded original estimates  
• Apply related insights to evaluate the potential for future cost reductions using 
comparable technology 
 
Two cases were considered:   
1) Introduction of large-area tandem amorphous silicon (a-Si) thin-film modules into 
the global PV market, and  
2) Transfer of cadmium telluride (CdTe) thin-film research results to a production 
environment.  
 
Recognizing that “time is money” in matters of this sort, it is instructive to place cost 
experience in the context of R&D and commercialization phases and their duration.  
Figure EC-1 below provides a program chronology for the two cases.   
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The chronology suggests that the average time elapsed between the start of the R&D 
phase and program termination was roughly 20 years for two cases that stopped short of 
full commercial success.  While this result may not be representative of an entire class of 
technology, or other on-going cases, it does provide potentially useful benchmarks. 
 
Tandem amorphous silicon summary 
 
The tandem amorphous silicon commercialization efforts began with funding and 
construction of a manufacturing plant intended to produce 10MW per year.  Product 
efficiency, plant throughput, and yield shortfalls limited actual realized capacity to 
around 6MW per year.   
 
The commercialization effort was driven by three dramatically different market strategies 
at different stages:   
1) The original strategy (internal sales of frameless and otherwise unfinished glass to 
glass laminates for large privately financed power projects) proved infeasible.1  
2) The second strategy (competition with crystalline products for market share in all 
major market segments) proved feasible, though financially unattractive, under 
the circumstances.  It required significant product development and inline process 
work.2    
3) The third strategy (internal sales of a specialized building integrated PV (BIPV) 
product) was temporarily successful and also required significant product 
development and manufacturing process enhancements. 
 
Factory and support organizations struggled to support the strategy changes.  Related 
customer and internal company coordination posed significant challenges. 
 
Cost models evolved toward greater detail but did not change in basic structure.  Cost 
forecasts did change significantly.  Some of the significant individual changes were 
independent of product specification; including those driven by the inability to achieve 
originally forecast conversion efficiencies, line yields, staffing levels, depreciation, and 
other fixed costs.  Original material cost estimates held up fairly well.   
 
Other significant changes were driven by the above market strategy changes, as reflected 
in product specifications.  The first strategy change resulted in a requirement for a 
product line with nominal voltages and other product features compatible with typical PV 
end uses at the time.  These features included: 
• Framing and strengthened glass for robustness,  
• Factory-installed industry standard cables and connectors, and  
• Improved encapsulation and edge insulation as necessary to meet various safety 
and product life qualification and certification processes and standards.3   
 
The second strategy change introduced the requirement for “vision glass,” i.e. semi-
transparent laminates with special edge connectors suitable for use in canopies and, 
ultimately, windows.   
 
 3
Both market strategy changes involved trade-offs among marketing, technology, 
engineering, and manufacturing.  Some trade-offs would have been better and more 
economically manageable prior to production rather than during an extended production 
ramp.  For example, the transition to processing strengthened glass was especially slow 
and costly – and never fully executed.  In the meantime, both factory and customers dealt 
with the problems of material more susceptible to breakage and crack propagation in 
handling, shipping, and long-term operation than competing products already in the 
market. 
 
The owners of the commercialization effort and its assets probably considered the cost 
experience analyzed here in deciding to abandon the effort.  The original plan called for 
the prototype factory to be replicated extensively while being upgraded with new 
deposition technology.  The vision was to achieve hundreds of MW/year of cumulative 
manufacturing capacity over in the decade following successful prototype factory 
operation.  Prototype factory performance could not have been regarded as successful 
relative to the original targets; accordingly, the original strategic vision had been 
abandoned well before the prototype factory itself was abandoned.  A break-even factory 
operation might still have survived based on yet a third market strategy change, i.e. to 
focus on markets involving single modules vs. larger arrays.    
 
A recommitment to this original vision for the technology, as some have recently 
proposed, might reasonably target manufacturing costs in the same range as originally 
forecast, i.e. $0.75/W in 1995 dollars for unframed annealed glass laminates lacking 
cables and connectors.  Success would require achievement of the originally targeted 
efficiencies as well as the ability to spread fixed costs over multiple, identical new 
factories once the cost target could be validated in a prototype plant.  Success in 
achieving these costs would not guarantee market success.  One thing experience makes 
clear is that the existing and foreseeable markets want products more robust and 
completely featured – and, therefore, significantly more costly – than the product targeted 
more than10 years ago. 
 
A different original vision, involving a more appropriate choice of entry markets, might 
have yielded different results.  The appropriate entry market for tandem amorphous 
might, for example, have been the remote power market, ironically a market segment in 
which its sponsor had excellent access.  Instead, applications in the targeted entry market, 
large-scale power plants, would have not only required near-perfect execution in the 
scale-up phase but also significant subsequent technology and engineering upgrades.4   
    
Cadmium telluride summary 
 
The cadmium telluride commercialization effort was launched at a plant originally 
intended to produce 10MW of single-junction amorphous silicon product annually.5  The 
project replaced front-end amorphous silicon deposition equipment with cadmium 
telluride deposition equipment.  Unlike the above tandem amorphous silicon effort, the 
effort was not preceded by pilot manufacturing and sale of small area modules using the 
same basic film deposition technology.  The market vision was relatively under-
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developed at the time scale-up was committed, although the product and manufacturing 
vision were well informed by previous single junction amorphous silicon production 
experience at the same site.  The experience, however, did not overcome the cost, 
schedule, and performance challenges associated with unique chemical deposition 
processes and equipment.  
 
In support of investment decisions, detailed manufacturing cost models were developed.  
In contrast to the tandem amorphous silicon case above, forecasted costs changed in a 
favorable direction during the preproduction phase as significant efficiency 
improvements – higher watts per unit – were achieved during process development 
before full-scale production was attempted.  Subsequently, because the endeavor was 
abandoned before routine shipments of commercial product could be achieved, the cost 
model and forecasted costs did not evolve further except to accommodate various module 
engineering changes related to encapsulation, cabling, and connectors; and strengthened 
glass and framing options.  Product stewardship costs were a major consideration, based 
on market information suggesting that arrangements would be needed to support “cradle-
to-grave” or even “cradle-to-cradle” product recovery, disposal, and/or recycling.  Again, 
forecasts were made but were not validated by commercial experience. 
 
The cadmium telluride effort was instructive regarding the time and cost required to 
transfer limited R&D processes into full-scale manufacturing.  Examples include 
accommodating the realities of local labor markets, and the losses of continuity and 
technology support when originating R&D staff is not co-located with nor accountable to 
the commercialization project manager.  The effort took place under conditions not likely 
to be repeated.  The unique circumstances of a corporate merger and related downsizing 
activity had an impact.  There was a need to convert an incomplete R&D result to 
complete engineering reality on a compressed schedule that had no margin to 
accommodate technical setbacks or accomplish inevitable process and engineering 
changes.  There was also no time to investigate and design around phenomena that had 
not been exposed in the R&D process (e.g., anomalous differences between outdoor and 
indoor performance) nor was there time to adjust product design and process engineering 
in order to pass qualification tests and achieve necessary product certifications.          
 
Perspective    
 
The reviews summarized here focused on cost experience.  Some cost-related 
observations common to both cases include:  
 
• First-order thin-film PV cost drivers are module electrical efficiency and process 
throughput6; second order is production yield; third order is economies in materials 
and labor; there may be no single dominant driver7. 
• Both efforts validated the intrinsic ($/Wp) cost advantage of thin-film PV, i.e. unlike 
crystalline, thin-film’s intrinsic material costs are largely (around 80%) associated 
with materials other than the active PV materials.  However, this advantage can be 
overwhelmed by other fixed and variable manufacturing costs (capital and labor) 
when thin-film efficiencies fall well short of crystalline efficiencies.8 
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• Large-scale thin-film manufacturing requires major financial investment over several 
years.  Initial capital investment in a factory scaling up from R&D results can be as 
high as $2-3 per watt for a 10MW/year thin-film factory; capitalized operating losses 
on the way to mature full capacity operation can be in the same range, in which case 
the financial breakeven horizon may be pushed out a decade or more beyond its 
original target.   
• The manufacturing cost targets of the two efforts reviewed were quite aggressive yet 
well above $1/Wp (2005 $) for glass-glass laminate modules.  The review did not 
suggest ways these goals could have been achieved with the technologies at their 
stage of development when the factories were abandoned.  Targeting installed costs 
in the same range for generically similar products from new factories9 lacks 
grounding either in experience reported here or foreseeable technology 
improvements.   
Low cost per Watt is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition in order for thin-film 
modules to take power array sales away from crystalline modules; the generically lower 
power density of thin-film modules imposes greater balance of system costs which scale 
with the efficiency deficit.  The effect varies with application.  In some applications thin-
film modules having significantly lower efficiency than crystalline counterparts cannot be 
priced low enough to off-set the balance of system cost penalty without jeopardizing the 
financial viability of the manufacturer.  Regardless of efficiency, thin-film products 
lacking a track record in the market may not command the same unit price ($/W) the 
market is willing to pay for familiar and proven products having equivalent 
specifications.  Thus, there are significant barriers to market entry facing new PV module 
offerings that are not addressed by the current study. 
 
Cost experience cannot completely be separated from other observations, which include:   
 
• Good R&D and pilot production using R&D equipment does not guarantee 
commercial success – both tandem a-Si technology and CdTe technology achieved 
impressive efficiency targets over short time periods, but the knowledge base needed 
for high volume manufacturing at competitive costs was still in development at the 
time of production start-up and even when each effort was concluded. 
• The stage-gate management of a developing technology does serve to emphasize 
critical performance measurements and to focus the management of the project; 
significant resources in time, equipment and staff may still need to be expended 
before a clear path to commercial success or a shutdown decision can be reached; in 
both thin-film cases covered here, the parent enterprise was already producing 
technically competitive products, thus reducing the incentive to persevere in dealing 
with set-backs and limitations.  The bar was high for both challenger technologies.   
• Initial product specifications in both cases were consistent with minimizing factory 
value-added features and therefore manufacturing cost, envisioning that mounting 
system and interconnection designs suitable for glass-glass laminate modules would 
be prepared by others.  More recent module industry trends are actually maximizing 
factory value-added features in pursuit of plug-and-play functionality to minimize 
installation costs and complexity.10   
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• Emerging PV technology should aim to meet the requirements of existing markets, 
unless it offers an extremely inviting competitive advantage in an emerging market.  
Managing both market risk and technology risk is much more difficult than managing 
one or the other independently. 
• PV markets demand results that research per se cannot deliver.  This is especially true 
if, as above, the plan is to meet the requirements of existing markets.  In this case, 
product development and engineering to meet industry standards (for reliability, 
safety and product life) must precede, not catch up with, factory operations.     
• Manufacturing start-up requires a skilled and dedicated work force; technicians and 
operators generally need to be trained by the enterprise.  Depending on local and 
national conditions, recruiting of technical staff can be problematic when local 
applicants with necessary specialized knowledge cannot be identified; location in 
strong industrial economies makes it easier to find second- and third-tier employees. 
• It is encouraging to note that some other glass-metal, thin-film product 
commercialization efforts appear to be progressing well.  Partnership with outside 
agencies can make substantive contributions in bringing a new technology on line; in 
terms of the cadmium telluride effort, there were demonstrable gains in technology 
and time as the result of working agreements with NREL and the Institute for Energy 
Conversion.  
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Introduction 
 
As part of reviewing the U.S. DOE Solar Program’s technical and economic targets for 
PV technology, it is important to place future projections in the context of real-world 
experience.  While current PV production is dominated by crystalline silicon technology, 
there are a number of emerging PV technologies that could gain significant market share 
in the future, if they can successfully compete with crystalline technology on price, 
performance, and overall functionality and aesthetics.  Estimating the potential for these 
emerging technologies to realize projected cost reductions is more of an art than a 
science. Thus, examining the available experience with scaling-up PV module 
manufacturing for a number of emerging PV technologies can help to build a sound 
foundation for evaluating the potential for these emerging PV technologies to meet the 
Solar Program’s technical and economic targets. 
 
In late 2002, two leading thin-film PV manufacturing scale-up and commercialization 
efforts were abandoned by a first-tier PV module manufacturer (BP Solar).  This report 
will refer to them variously by location, technology, and brand as follows: 
 
1. A tandem amorphous silicon (a-Si) PV module factory, dubbed by its owner as 
TF1, was built at Toano, Virginia, (near Williamsburg) based on several years of 
pilot manufacturing of smaller single-junction aSi modules at a combined 
research and production facility in Newtown, Pennsylvania.  The tandem a-Si 
modules shipped from Toano were branded generally as Millennia.    
 
2. A factory was assembled at Fairfield, California, by converting a factory 
originally designed to produce single-junction amorphous silicon modules to 
instead produce cadmium telluride (CdTe) PV modules using a technology known 
internally at BP Solar as Apollo.  
 
These two efforts afford a unique opportunity to examine such scale-up and 
commercialization experience without hazard to ongoing private-sector initiatives.  
Efforts over a 5- to 10-year scale-up period were reviewed in order to: 
   
• Trace the evolution of production cost models; 
• Develop a chronology of decisions made that influenced manufacturing cost; 
• Examine the factors that drove changes in projected cost estimates; 
• Evaluate the differences between realized cost and expected cost in order to 
gain insights into the reasons for divergence between these costs.  
• Identify key factors that influenced realized cost and expected cost (such as 
changing market requirements, warranties, qualification processes, the degree of 
factory vertical integration, etc.); and 
• Draw experience-based insights in order to estimate the potential for future cost 
reductions in these technologies over the next 10-15 years. 
 
The available experience must be understood as incomplete.  The Apollo CdTe factory 
operated in an extended start-up mode only; the Millennia tandem a-Si factory was 
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ramped up over a period of years to operate at full staffing and a capacity of several MW 
per year – though not at its design capacity of 10MW per year.  Nevertheless, valuable 
and still relevant cost experience and practical lessons were learned at both locations and 
are presented separately in subsequent sections.11    
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Case Study:  Tandem Amorphous Silicon 
 
A factory (to be referred to hereafter as TF1) was funded, constructed, staffed, and 
operated for a few years; and its initial commercial products (to be referred to hereafter 
by their brand name, Millennia) were shipped to customers worldwide.  However, (see 
Figure 1) TF1 never operated close to its intended capacity, nor were product 
specifications and product mix consistent from year to year.  As a result, available cost 
data reflects the status of a work in progress, not by any means the statistics of a mature 
manufacturing operation.  Trends are discernible – some cost elements stabilized nicely – 
and some favorable cost trends emerged.  Some specific quantitative results are 
generically representative, but all reflect a variety of interactive circumstances and design 
and operational choices, the composite of which is unlikely to be precisely replicated.    
 
Figure 1.  TF1 Planned vs. Actual 
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Some words of perspective are necessary before turning to the analysis.   
 
First, deposition of amorphous silicon can be accomplished my multiple methods on 
multiple substrates using deposition recipe and device structure designs that are nearly 
unlimited.  The basic design used for Millennia involved deposition on a tin oxide coated 
glass surface using an in-line process, with encapsulation of the film accomplished by 
laminating the film between two glass sheets bonded together with a layer of ethyl vinyl 
acetate encapsulant.  The relative advantages and disadvantages of this approach vs. 
others under development at the time are significant and beyond the scope of the work 
reported here.  The advantages were demonstrated in commercial practice.  The 
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disadvantages may be inferred from sections of the report describing market strategy, 
process and module engineering changes required during the commercialization process.  
 
Second, the TF1 experience brought together unique and powerful capabilities and 
resources under qualified management.  In the areas where the organizations involved fell 
short, the lack was not in the organization, its experience or its leadership.  The attempt 
was as well-positioned for success as possible at the time, drawing on extremely strong 
and patient corporate ownership, a foundational 15-year $200 million R&D investment 
resulting in world-leading organizational experience and competency, and the technical 
and business infrastructure support of the largest U.S.-owned PV manufacturer.  
However, the challenge was much greater than anticipated by investing and supporting 
organizations.12
 
Third, U.S. PV R&D programs have usefully turned their attention to cost, especially 
“system-driven” cost.  In parallel, there has been an equally useful exploration of 
economic value by leading PV analysts.  The TF1 story features the interplay of cost and 
value and is particularly instructive in that regard.  In setting initial targets, nearly every 
parameter related to customer value was adjusted to minimize manufacturing cost, at 
considerable sacrifice to product attributes of standard crystalline modules.  As a result of 
cost minimization on the module side and extremely aggressive assumptions on the 
system side, extremely aggressive installed costs were forecast by the project’s sponsors.  
When it became necessary to adjust the factory’s products to compete for a share of less 
ideal, but already established – or at least emerging – markets, manufacturing costs 
increased incrementally for a number of market- and system-driven reasons.  Unframed 
laminate costs were already higher than targeted because of substantially lower than 
targeted efficiencies.  When later it became necessary to exploit unique features of the 
technology to capture large special orders, further significant costs were added.  The 
“system driven” added costs in both cases are sometimes overlooked in analyses that 
focus on process- and efficiency-driven core product unit ($/W) costs.  The result can be 
“apples and oranges” comparisons between functionally non-equivalent products.  
 
Visions and Models 
 
Business visions and models changed as experience accumulated.    
 
First Business Vision – Solar Farm Deployment and “Super-Large-Scale” 
Manufacturing:  The initial view of TF1 was that it was to be the sole source of module 
supply to a new business unit chartered to develop, design, and finance central solar 
power plants and other grid-tied PV applications.  At the time, the initial vision was 
revolutionary and hinged on unprecedented manufacturing scale-up in support of large 
projects that were to create the necessary demand.  The related business model 
anticipated forward integration from module production through the sale of electricity.  It 
hinged on a pre-negotiated transfer price (set at $0.75/Wp), according to the terms of the 
joint venture that funded the factory and the specification for the product to be delivered 
(to the project development business unit) at this transfer price. 
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Validation of this business model failed.  No solar farm projects achieved financial 
closing, and thin-film modules meeting the intended specification would not have been 
available to them if they had.13
 
Second Business Vision – Supplant Crystalline in Emerging High Growth Markets:  
Accordingly, TF1 was re-cast in the role of supplying and enhancing an ongoing 
crystalline PV module manufacturing business (Solarex1) by introducing a new product 
that promised lower production costs and, therefore, enhanced the profitability and 
growth potential of the original business. It was accepted that this would lead to capping 
Solarex crystalline capacity, while thin-film capacity expanded to meet market growth.  
The vision was founded on internal Solarex manufacturing scale-up forecasts completed 
in 1994 showing that thin-film manufacturing costs would level out well below costs of 
polycrystalline modules, thus providing a new technology platform for the already 
established module manufacturing business.  The related business model anticipated 
forward integration from module production to the sale of systems, with internal module 
sales supplemented by sales through distribution.  The model evolved pragmatically – 
product variations were added opportunistically with a goal to fill the factory, as well as 
profitably satisfy the requirements of existing distribution customers and emerging on-
grid markets.   
     
Third Business Vision – “The Future is BIPV”:  The third and final business vision 
tacitly conceded that the path to decisive cost advantage vs. crystalline would, at best, be 
longer and less certain than expected.  Exploiting the ability to alter the visual and optical 
specification of Millennia modules, it incorporated aspects of both preceding visions, i.e. 
sales of a single special-design product to a sister business unit, i.e. BP Retail, along with 
sales of this new product (and the existing product line) to external customers in 
emerging BIPV market segment.  The related business model was a hybrid between the 
two prior models, differing from the original in emphasizing a revolutionary premium 
product for captive customers vs. a cost-engineered economy product unsuited to the 
existing external market. 
 
These models influenced key related corporate functions – including sales and marketing 
and R&D.  They did not directly affect intrinsic costs of the basic product platform, but 
they did significantly affect finished product costs in each case. 
 
Cost Models  
 
The core cost model supporting all three business visions and models was simple and 
traditional.  Consistent with the PV market at the time, its primary metric was the cost of 
a finished module divided by product nameplate rating in peak direct current Watts.  
Starting with a single product intended for a single customer, product variations 
expanded to the point that the TF1 product line essentially mirrored the Solarex 
crystalline product line in meeting a range of segment-specific market requirements.  
                                                 
 
1 Solarex was founded independently in 1973, purchased by Amoco in 1983, and became a business unit of 
Amoco/Enron Solar, a joint venture between Amoco and Enron formed at the end of 1994.  
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This created the need for a more detailed (but not fundamentally different) cost model 
able to account for differences among products having different electrical characteristics, 
mechanical specifications, and framing and electrical termination designs (see Table 1).  
Subsequent expansion of the product line to include and emphasize “vision glass” 
modules (to be referred to hereafter by their brand name, PowerView) required only 
incremental changes to the cost model initially, because the initial PowerView products 
were sized and rated in the same range as existing products.  Had such premium products 
succeeded in the broader building products market, a manufacturing cost model 
facilitating trade-offs between power output and optical specifications eventually would 
have been needed. 
 
$/Wp (1) $/module
Varible Costs 
Direct Labor (2) 
Materials (3)
Labor Overhead (4)
Total Variable
Fixed Costs (3) 
Utilities/Rent/Interest 
Indirect Labor
Depreciation (6) 
Total Fixed 
Total Cost (FOB factory)
Notes:
1.  Wp = nameplate power, i.e. instantaneous module power under standard test conditions
2.  Yielded hours per unit times DL rate per hour divided by Wp
3.  Yielded unit cost divided by Wp
4.  Yielded hours per unit times O/H rate per hour divided by Wp
5.  Allocation in $/Wp reflecting corporate accounting model, actual costs and cost allocations
$/Wp (1)
Table 1.  Cost Model
6.  Depreciation life of manufacturing equipment taken as 15 years.   
 
 
Cost Evolution Detailed Analysis 
 
Major Product and Cost Model Changes 
 
The cost model in Table 1 can be used to analyze the nature and impact of specific 
manufacturing and product-line changes that were implemented over the course of 
commercialization efforts.  The model did not change structurally, but its imbedded 
assumptions did evolve.  Table 2 expands the model to evaluate the impact of 
manufacturing process changes and experience, as well as product-line changes.  
Representative costs are included – they are experience-based estimates, not actual 
 13
recorded costs.  Unit costs are presented in $/Wp, and total costs are also presented in 
$/m2.  The following narrative briefly outlines each evolutionary change and its rationale. 
 
$/m2 
Year Reason for Change Watts Total Chg. Total
Direct 
Labor Matl
Labor 
O/H
Plug 
and 
Play Frame
Semi-
transpa
rent
Strong 
Glass Power Yield Power
1994 Base annealed HV lam 62 0.04 0.37 0.17 0.25 0.83 64.2
1995 Project re-design/re-est. (1) 56 0.04 0.49 0.19 0.35 1.07 0.24 74.8
1995 Depreciation correct. 56 0.04 0.49 0.19 0.65 1.37 0.30 95.7
1995 Staffing re-est. 56 0.15 0.49 0.19 0.65 1.48 0.11 103.4
1999 Material re-est. 56 0.15 0.51 0.19 0.65 1.50 0.02 104.8
0.0
0.0
1996 Switch to MV 56 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 1.53 0.03 106.9
0.0
1999 P&P lam product 56 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.06 1.59 0.06 111.1
2001 HS lam product 56 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.06 0.15 1.74 0.15 121.6
2001 Actual module power (3) 43 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.15 0.34 0.20 2.32 0.58 124.5
2002 Actual total yield 43 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.20 2.47 0.15 132.4
0.54 0.0
1998 P&P framed product 56 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.06 0.21 1.80 0.27 125.8
2001 HS P&P framed product 56 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.06 0.21 0.15 1.95 0.15 136.3
2001 Actual module power (3) 43 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.34 0.20 2.53 0.58 135.8
2002 Actual total yield 43 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.20 2.68 0.15 143.7
0.54 0.0
0.0
2000 BIPV lam product 53 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.04 2.00 0.47 132.6
2001 Cosmetic BIPV lam 53 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.32 0.05 0.04 2.05 0.04 135.3
2001 HS BIPV lam 53 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.32 0.15 0.06 0.04 2.20 0.16 145.6
2001 Actual module power 40 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.21 0.32 0.15 0.44 0.20 2.95 0.74 147.1
2002 Actual total yield 40 0.15 0.54 0.19 0.65 0.10 0.21 0.32 0.15 0.44 0.15 0.20 3.09 0.15 154.5
Notes:
1.  Module power reflects efficiency loss due to CTO outsourcing (-10%).
2.  LV and "cut" products were introduced in 98, having higher manufacturing costs and also higher customer value - cost estimates are not included.
3.  Actual avg module power was 43W, not 56W, reflecting soda lime vs. low iron glass (-10%), MV vs. HV (-2%), and process transfer loss (-18%).  
4.  Throughput and line availability (key fixed cost drivers) limited annual factory financial performance, but are assumed, for estimation purposes 
to have been on target at 25 starts per hour and 7000 hours per year.
5.  All costs are consultant estimates based on interpretation of actual experience - no comparable tabulation exists in company files. 
$/W internalized and fully built up (5)
Table 2.  Estimated TF1 Manufacturing Costs
Vision Glass
Solar Farm Vision
Supplant Crystalline Vision
Future is BIPV Vision
Plug and Play
Framing
Fixed 
Base
Factory Development 
Commercial Production (2)
Variable DeltaVariable Base Fixed Delta (4)
 
  
Initial Product Functional Specification 
 
The initial product specification called for a module having a total area of 0.8 square 
meters, stabilized efficiency under standard test conditions of 8% (based on aperture 
area), resulting in a nameplate rating of 61.7 Watts, and a cell width resulting in nominal 
operating voltages above 100V, consistent with the product’s intended use in large “solar 
farm” arrays. 
 
Target Costs 
 
In the early stage of joint venture negotiations (May 1994), the first manufacturing plant 
was envisioned as a full-scale prototype of future plants to be rated at 120MW/year.  
Later target production costs for TF1 were remarkably consistent with the initial 
scenarios, even to the extent of assuming identical direct-labor costs.  Target fixed and 
variable costs for TF1 were $0.25/W and $0.58/W respectively, consistent with a 
negotiated transfer price between the joint venture’s manufacturing unit and power 
project development unit of $0.75/W (1995$) 
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Project Redesign and Re-estimation  
 
Emphasis in the second half of 1994 was on validating the 8% efficiency target, and also 
on establishing a capital budget.  It was not until the joint venture closed at the end of 
1994 that efforts were initiated to develop a project plan, select a site, or select 
engineering and construction contractors.  By August 1995, having accomplished these 
tasks, it was possible to re-estimate the project cost based on site-specific information, 
results of process validation,  preliminary equipment specification/design/selection,  
further process development, and initial plant layouts.  The resulting project capital cost 
estimate exceeded the target budget by about 50%, primarily because the number of 
silicon deposition chambers had apparently been underestimated by 36%.14
 
Design efforts also failed to validate the readiness of the process and equipment used to 
deposit conductive tin oxide in pilot production, and it was determined that an additional 
tin oxide-deposition furnace would be required.  As a result, a decision was made to out-
source tin oxide-coated glass and eliminate the coating equipment from the front of the 
line.  This decision had major implications for product efficiency and therefore cost (i.e. 
10% reduction and 11% increase respectively), and also major implications for variable 
material cost (i.e. 22% increase), though the eventual effect was thought to be less at the 
time.15   
 
In addition, revised estimates of Germane2 costs and use resulted in another 11% variable 
materials cost increase.  Finally, labor overhead costs were revised upward by 12%.   
 
The project capital re-estimate would have increased the depreciation component of fixed 
costs by about 40% from $0.15/W to $0.25/W; however, around the same time, the 
original allocation for depreciation – was increased to around $0.55/W, for an overall 
267% increase.16  The latter allocation for depreciation appears consistent with a 15 year 
depreciation period, depreciation schedules consistent with generally accepted accounting 
standards, and plant capital costs in the $30-35 million range, combined with capitalized 
pre-commercial operating costs in the $5-10 million range. 
 
The target direct-labor estimate, $0.04/W, would have been consistent with plant staffing 
in the 25-30 range, whereas later staffing estimates based on start-up operations and 
initial production put the requirement in the 80-100 range, consistent with a philosophy 
of relying on manual intervention in critical line transitions before moving to full 
automation. Direct-labor estimates ranged somewhat higher but eventually stabilized in 
the range of $0.15/W, a 275% increase from the original target, suggesting that the 
original target may have carried forward without examination from early estimates for 
conceptual plants rated at >100MW/year. 
 
Re-estimated variable material costs (for full area laminates, i.e. the original target 
product) proved more reliable and were only adjusted upward by a small percentage over 
subsequent years. 
                                                 
 
2 Germane is a gas containing Germanium 
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Overall, correction of errors ($0.41/W), experience-based re-estimates of various cost 
elements ($0.15/W), and targeting 9% lower product efficiency initially ($0.11/W) 
resulted in a $0.67/W (or roughly 81% increase) in the base cost of the original target 
product, without accounting for the effects of actual vs. targeted line yield and actual vs. 
targeted product efficiency.17  These latter effects, to be considered below, resulted in 
combined incremental additional increases in base cost of $0.70 to $0.80/W, depending 
on the specification of the finished product.  Thus, in 1995, the base cost of the product, 
assuming originally targeted line yield and efficiency, increased by nearly $0.70/W.  
Factoring in the effect of actual vs. targeted yield and efficiency results in an additional 
$0.70/W to $0.80/W increase. 
 
In summary, the reasons for higher than forecast base product cost were: 
1. Underestimates, including direct labor, plant equipment, depreciation and 
material costs 
2. Inability to achieve target product efficiencies and line yields18 
 
Product Specification Changes 
 
“Medium” Voltage (MV) 
 
While TF1 was being built, a separate business unit was working to develop large grid-
tied projects to absorb its output.  Meanwhile, efforts were underway among U.S. utilities 
and government allies to promote other PV applications in the United States, including 
smaller grid-tied applications.  Though the TF1 product, as specified, was a questionable 
fit with these applications (due to its efficiency disadvantage), emerging grid rooftop 
markets offered an opportunity to deploy relatively large numbers of modules from the 
new factory without “cannibalizing” the existing crystalline module sales.  Accordingly,  
proposals were developed that would tap government programs to allow the new thin-
film modules to be offered at a discount and packaged conveniently for use in grid 
rooftop projects.  Projects resulting from these proposals ultimately facilitated nearly 
2MW of thin-film module sales19.   
 
The “high-voltage” thin-film module targeted by the new thin-film joint venture, though 
conceptually optimum for large arrays, was poorly suited to grid rooftop and other near-
term, grid-tied markets.  Suppliers of inverters for grid-tied applications in the United 
States were few, and their products were designed to accommodate the electrical 
specifications of typical commercial PV modules.3  Accordingly, a decision was reached 
to introduce a module with cell interconnects running parallel to the long side of the 
module instead of parallel to the short side, as in the high-voltage module.  This allowed 
                                                 
 
3 Most crystalline PV modules at the time had nominal voltages that were multiples of 12V (i.e. 12V for 
battery charging applications and 24V larger area modules for both battery charging and grid-tied arrays).  
One crystalline manufacturer had introduced a 48V module that was popular in the US for grid-tied arrays, 
and Solarex had a similar design not yet in production.   
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for a nominal voltage of 48 volts (vs. the original 110V) without unduly compromising 
module efficiency.  Some compromise was necessary due to the change in cell width and 
additional length of current collection paths, which also increased the use of “frit,” the 
silver-based paste used to create low-resistance internal current paths within the module.  
The effect of the additional frit use is estimated at $0.03/W, increasing overall materials 
cost by about 6%. 
 
Plug and Play  
 
The target module specification for solar farms was ideal from a manufacturing 
perspective, i.e. not only, as discussed, in calling for a single product for a single 
customer, but also in calling for a product with no value-added features at all.  Such a 
product is a convenient basis for comparison with other “ideal,” i.e. “no value-added,” 
products4.  However, such comparisons need to be undertaken with care for the following 
reasons:  
 
• Some value-added features are demanded by the market,  
• These features account for significant percentages of overall product cost, that 
vary with module footprint and efficiency  
• The percentages vary significantly depending on the product platform,  
 
For example, products sold at the time into the general market had factory-installed 
“junction boxes,” which typically added a few cents per watt to crystalline module 
manufacturing cost.  At the time, plug-type connectors were an emerging, not fully 
proven, solution – though leading system integrators quickly began to demand factory 
installation of specific plug-type connectors.  For on-grid applications – the now-
dominant market segment – factory-installed connector cables terminated in plug-type 
connectors are now standard, adding, in the case of Millennia, $4 to $9 to product unit 
cost.  The estimated cost impact of plug-and-play finishing is $0.22/W and $0.15/W for 
laminate and framed products respectively.  BIPV products involving light transmission 
have a cosmetic requirement to move the electrical termination to the module’s edge, at 
an additional cost estimated in the $0.05/W to $0.10/W range. A variety of “edge 
connector” designs were evaluated.  Initial generic vision glass and service station 
canopy products did not include them, but later versions did.20       
 
Strengthened (toughened) Glass 
 
Early visions for large thin-film factories recognized the fact that, in markets where 
modules would substitute for other glass-based products, they would have to include the 
same type of glass.  Glass that is “framed,” as in smaller residential windows, does not 
need to be particularly strong, because the frame protects it from bending stresses and 
crack initiators such as edge chips and handling impacts.  Other glass applications, i.e. 
                                                 
 
4 The target TF1 product was essentially stripped down for low cost.  The real products that were actually 
sold included many value added aspects and were more costly.   
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any in which glass is both an optical and structural element (or any where impacts could 
result in breakage and flying shards) require toughening the glass both to prevent 
breakage and to minimize the related hazards by minimizing the size of broken 
fragments.   
 
Toughening is basically accomplished by heat treatment that results in compressive 
stresses in the surface layers of the glass, which tend to cancel the tensile stresses that are 
induced in one surface layer when the glass is twisted or bent (glass is weak in tension.)  
The toughening process adds significantly to the cost of the glass.  Further, because 
toughened glass tends to shatter rather than crack, it does not lend itself to products that 
require final sizing after other value-added steps.  There are no commercially useful 
processes for cutting toughened glass. 
 
Crystalline modules use a single layer of tempered (high-strength) glass to provide 
structural stability and environmental protection for thin, fragile PV cells.  Framed 
crystalline modules are remarkably resistant to impact and the rigors of shipping and 
normal handling.  If the targeted initial use of TF1 product had been the general market, it 
is almost certain that at least one of the two glass elements would have had to be strong, 
preferably both.  If pilot manufacturing had been attempted on strong glass, the factory 
and deposition equipment design would have accommodated the requirement to preserve 
the dimensional stability of the front glass during the deposition process.  Unfortunately, 
the factory was built in anticipation of depositing the films on “annealed,” i.e. standard, 
non-strengthened glass.  Being free of pre-stressed areas, such glass does not tend to warp 
significantly when its surface layers are subjected to convective or radiant heating, as in 
some steps in the piloted TF1 film-deposition process.   
 
There was cursory consideration of using strengthened glass in the early stages of project 
planning and implementation.  The decision against strengthened glass might have been 
compelled by the likely cost impact and related technical jeopardy to implementing the 
factory project; but it also might have been rationalized on the (then baseline) assumption 
that the product would primarily be used in large arrays where annealed glass solutions 
had already proven suitable.5
 
As it turned out, the decision had major implications for product cost and other important 
market considerations.  Glass breakage and cracking was a thread that ran through the 
commercialization effort like a painful nerve.  Its symptoms, chronologically, can be 
briefly traced as follows: 
 
1996 – Customer Samples.  Modules from half-area (4ft2) pilot production were offered 
to the initial customer base and used in demonstration arrays.  Many broke or cracked in 
transit or in use, resulting in a requirement for more careful handling and more robust 
packaging. 
 
                                                 
 
5 The 400kW single junction aSi array at PVUSA incorporated frameless double annealed glass laminates. 
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1997 – Prototype Multi-module Panels.  Demonstration arrays and installations 
involved mounting of glass laminates to metal racks or in preassembled, multi-module 
panels using two-sided tape as the attachment vehicle.  Accidental twisting of the multi-
module panels resulted in cracks and breakage that compromised array performance, 
though methods were developed to make module removal and replacement more 
convenient.   
 
1998 – The “Pillow Effect.”  The initial lamination process used in production resulted 
in squeezing encapsulant preferentially out of module edge areas, resulting in what was 
referred to as a “pillow effect” with the glass layers ending up closer together at the edges 
than in the middle surface layers and the glass edge areas pre-stressed in tension after the 
glass cooled and the encapsulant cured.  This made the modules more vulnerable to 
cracks initiating and propagating from their edges due to thermal stresses and thermal 
shocks in normal operation.  The two initial customers most enthusiastic about 
Millennia’s performance and cost advantages in their applications, i.e. PowerLight 
Corporation (a U.S. system integrator) and Polyene (a company developing the solar 
water pumping market in India), were the first to raise concerns about excessive module 
cracking and the premature module failures that could be expected as a result.  Both 
companies invoked the product warranty and were partially compensated for their 
losses.6  The lamination process defect that caused the vulnerability to cracking was 
corrected as soon as it was identified.  However, by then some product made with the 
defective process had been shipped and installed.   
 
1999 – Market-Driven Business Plan.  At year-end, a cross-functional7 planning team 
was chartered to: 
 
• Provide a new vision for the TF business unit, and  
• Identify key actions leading to profitability by year-end 2000, shipments of 100% 
of production by year-end 2001, and sustainable business growth thereafter.   
 
The team concluded that acceptance of the then-current product (43W, annealed glass, 
glass-to-glass encapsulation) would be limited to a few sub-segments of the overall PV 
market; and that this would result in insufficient demand to support profitability or 
business growth.  Their plan called for converting the factory to flexible production of a 
range of products generally accepted in current markets and significantly advantaged in 
emerging on-grid markets.  They recommended shifting production to deposit films in 
multiple electrical configurations, resulting in lighter-framed 12V modules with ratings 
of 5, 10, 20 and 43W for remote markets, to deposit films on heat strengthened or 
tempered glass, resulting in lighter and more robust framed and unframed, full-size 
modules for on-grid markets (site assembled and packaged system solutions), and finally 
                                                 
 
6 Polyene’s business success hinged on the success of its initial installations using Solarex thin-film 
products; the company eventually failed after lengthy negotiations to resolve its claim that the modules 
found to be cracked were defective as shipped and that consequential costs should be covered . 
7 Manufacturing, marketing, technology, business development, sales, finance, and product development 
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to add the capability to laser ablate the film, resulting in light-transmitting “vision glass” 
and special feature (logo patterned) modules for BIPV.   
 
2000 – Deposition on Strengthened Glass.  By year-end 1999, the implications of the 
planned switch to heat-strengthened products were better understood, and plans were in 
place to introduce such products starting in the first quarter of 2000.  Heat-strengthened 
glass/Tedlar laminate costs were expected to be $0.2/W higher than comparable double-
annealed glass laminate costs.  Attempts during 2000 to process heat-strengthened glass 
using existing equipment and processes were unsuccessful – and also costly to factory 
operations – because of the need to use the manufacturing line for numerous engineering 
test runs over many months.21  Eventually, process and equipment modifications were 
identified and implemented that enabled limited numbers of heat-strengthened laminates 
(about 25kW) to be made for vision glass and other products in the first half of 2001.  It 
is assumed that heat-strengthened product production increased over the following year 
until BP Solar announced termination of TF1 operations.   
 
2001 – “Arc Risk." Because of delays in switching to at least partial production of heat-
strengthened product during 2000, PowerView modules shipped for initial BP service 
station canopy applications were double-annealed glass laminates.  By the end of 2000, 
several hundred kW of this product had been shipped.  In early 2001, eight modules in 
five installations in Indianapolis were damaged by electrical arcing.  All eight modules 
exhibited cracks of the front glass and resulting corrosion of film material.  Subsequent 
investigation determined that Millennia modules in grounded arrays operating at >100V 
relative to ground and experiencing glass breakage during or after installation were, or 
would be, at risk of arcing along the silver frit bus bars, and that heat generated by the arc 
could soften or melt the adjacent glass and/or pose hazards due to fire or falling objects 
under certain conditions.  Primary risk factors related to breakage risk and operating 
voltage.  Breakage risk, in turn, was determined by whether the glass was annealed or 
heat-strengthened; whether the glass was supported at its edges by a frame; and, if 
unframed, whether the glass laminate was properly mounted.8  
 
Cost Impact of Heat Strengthened Glass 
 
The cost impact of using stronger glass depends on the encapsulation approach.  For 
double-glass laminates, the total cost impact of two heat-strengthened glass layers is 
                                                 
 
8 The consequences of this determination were serious.  First, heat strengthened modules were not yet in 
production, and most existing Millennia installations, including those involving greatest safety risk (service 
station canopies) used power conversion equipment requiring array operation well over 100V.  Affected 
service station installations were tagged out pending inverter replacement, extensive testing was done in 
support of failure analysis and preparation of installation guidelines and risk assessment, and a 
communications plan was prepared.  In the end, such information remained closely held, and a 
comprehensive effort was made to evaluate risks, and where necessary, inspect and identify the condition 
of every existing Millennia installation, to the extent possible.  Considering the volume of product shipped 
by 2001, and assuming an average system size of 15kW, the numbers of installations covered by the 
investigation would have run into the hundreds.  System reconfigurations were required in some cases.  
Detailed statistics are not available. 
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estimated at $0.20/W, though lack of production experience suggests putting the cost 
impact in a range between $0.15/W and $0.30/W.  The total cost impact of switching 
framed modules from a double-annealed glass laminate to a heat-strengthened 
glass/EVA/tedlar laminate is estimated, again without benefit of production experience, 
at $0.15/W.  This estimate may be optimistic; production validation may or may not have 
occurred.22   
 
Frames   
 
Recognizing the below-target efficiency of the initial thin-film products and the 
problematic experience with preassembled multi-laminate panels, an effort was 
undertaken in support of the PV-VALUE9 program, targeting mounting solutions for 
double-glass laminate modules that would minimize area-related balance of system and 
installation costs, particularly for applications on residential roofs.  The innovation that 
resulted, the Integra framing and mounting system, was greeted with enthusiasm by some 
initial grid market customers, whose focus was retrofit applications on residential roofs, 
the application for which the solution was intended. 
 
Innovative solutions for installation on commercial roofs, i.e. PowerLight Corporation’s 
system using insulated roof pavers, were compatible with the original medium voltage 
(MV) laminate product.  However, grid-tied customers in non-U.S. markets, where the 
Integra product was not safety-certified, were demanding modules having standard 
frames.  Breakage experience (noted above) with annealed glass laminates also 
encouraged introduction of a broader range of framed modules.10
 
The total cost impact of framing of a nominal 43W Millennia modules is estimated at 
$0.21/W. 
 
“PowerView” 
 
Until 1999, the emerging market for building-integrated PV (BIPV), i.e. the substitution 
of PV modules for other building-envelope materials, had been a low priority, because of 
inherent conflicts with the company’s role as a leading high-volume, low-cost 
manufacturer of standard products.  (BIPV applications typically involved special 
products specified for use in “one-off” projects.)  However, during 1999, new company 
                                                 
 
9 A program established to develop and deploy packaged residential rooftop systems incorporating 
Millennia, with the assistance of a $2/Wac buy-down made possible by DOE cost sharing. 
10 Module frames, while adding significantly to module manufacturing cost, off-set some balance of system 
costs (the module frame becomes part of the overall mounting structure) and require no re-engineering of 
mounting solutions used with crystalline modules, nor any special new mounting hardware.  More 
importantly, frames provide the structural support necessary to package and ship individual modules rather 
than crates of modules, a strong consideration for distribution customers selling modules in smaller 
quantities.  It is of course essential that the active area of the laminate be properly insulated electrically and 
properly protected from water ingress; otherwise the frame provides a current path to ground accelerating 
module failure and resulting in ground faults. 
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leaders,11 most of whom had plate-glass manufacturing industry experience, established a 
direction for the thin-film business unit that envisioned high-volume production of 
standard BIPV products.  Their imagination had been captured by the technical ability to 
create architecturally and aesthetically unique modules using a laser-ablation process that 
created microscopic holes in the film.  The demonstrated potential to make a light- 
transmitting, thin-film laminate was quickly married to an initiative of the company’s 
new owner, BP, aiming to include PV arrays in the canopies of all new BP service 
stations in selected markets, including the United States.  The cost impact of 
“PowerView” processing is estimated at about $0.41/W, including the impact of power 
loss slightly greater than the level of film removal, i.e. 5% for initial products. 
 
Module Power 
 
Module power shortfalls had a major effect on cost, adding about $0.20/W to nominal 
fixed costs and more than $0.40/W to variable cost.  A factory sized to produce a certain 
number of units at the target rating will have an actual output proportional to module 
efficiency and costs inversely proportional to module efficiency. 
 
Specifically, a technology envisioned to rapidly achieve stablized 8% module efficiencies 
in production and improve significantly from there (see Figure 2), struggled at first to 
achieve 5.5%; and then stubbornly refused over a period of a few years to reach a point 
where significant numbers of higher-rated modules could be made, in spite of ongoing 
forecasts by company technologists that promised results consistent with the original 
vision.   
 
How could this happen?  No published explanation exists; a few observations can be 
offered to provide perspective: 
 
• There was significant efficiency variation in various process “recipes” evaluated 
during 1995 after the demonstration of 7.8% stabilized efficiency on half-size 
plates in 1994.  There were also differences among the various recipes in terms of 
deposition time, process readiness, and equipment and material cost.  It would 
have been natural to sacrifice efficiency in order to make conservative choices in 
other aspects (e.g., the decision to outsource tin oxide-coated glass at a penalty of 
about half a point in stabilized efficiency), hoping to recover lost efficiency via 
future process optimization and improvement.  
• Whether, in fact, any recipe demonstrated in experimental chambers operated by 
research staff could be effectively replicated in full-size, inline deposition 
chambers operated by factory floor staff is questionable.  Variations even among 
experimental chambers were significant. 
• Other decisions along the way – e.g., the switch from “high” to “medium” voltage 
discussed earlier. 
 
                                                 
 
11 In 1998, a new CEO and new technology and manufacturing executives were hired. 
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The catch-all explanation is simply “process transfer loss.”  A process that ostensibly 
delivered close to 8% efficiency using experimental chambers in pilot production of half-
area plates somehow lost 18% of projected module power when transferred to 
production, and this loss was never recovered.  
 
Yield 
 
Cost is likewise inversely related to overall process yield.  Relative to the original 92% 
target, actual total line yields for core products leveled off in the 70% to 80% range.23  
The estimated effect is to increase fixed costs by $0.15/W.  The assumptions behind the 
original yield assumption are unknown. 
 
Efficiency Penalty 
 
The numbers of relatively large systems using Millennia modules provided an 
opportunity to assess the effect on overall system cost of low efficiency and other 
inherent electrical and mechanical features.  Relative to the highest-performing modules 
available at the time, it was estimated that the impact on system cost of using Millennia 
instead of a higher-efficiency product was in the range of $0.16/efficiency point/W, or 
roughly $1/W vs. crystalline modules in commercial production at the time.  This impact 
was confirmed by an NREL-funded analysis by a major U.S. system integrator24  and 
was a major deterrent to the use of Millennia modules (even by BP Solar’s system sales 
teams) in large projects where high-volume crystalline pricing typically did not exceed 
high-volume Millennia pricing by enough to offset the penalty.  Obviously, the penalty 
would likely be greater now, based on crystalline module efficiency improvements over 
the intervening years. 
 
“Off-budget” or “Below the Line” Costs 
 
Transfer of a PV module technology from R&D to commercial production can incur 
major costs that are not counted in models like the one applied here.  Specifically, a 
factory has operating and fixed costs whether it is operating productively or not.  
Likewise, before, during, and after commissioning, there can be value in pilot production 
of prototype or precursor products.  Pilot lines and experimental equipment can allow for 
validation of processes and designs without tying up part or all of the main manufacturing 
line.  Continuing R&D aiming at future improvements in manufacturing processes or 
equipment may also be required if the factory is itself a prototype, and some technologies 
that may enhance future plants are not ready for commercial use at the time it is built and 
commissioned. 
 
Pre-commercial Operations 
In the case of TF1, the plan called for essentially full production within two years of 
project initiation.  Figure 1 shows the gap between planned and actual production.  Some 
cost savings can be captured by regulating staffing according to the ramp rate that 
technical progress permits while avoiding extremely low-yield operation; but fixed costs 
remain, as do R&D costs and variable costs that exceed product revenues.  For the TF1 
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start-up and production ramp, these costs ran to several millions of dollars annually.  
Some financial relief was available by “capitalizing” operating costs in the years prior to 
round-the-clock commercial production.  This resulted in an apparent capital cost much 
higher than the original plant budget and much higher than would have been justified by 
the plant’s originally projected economics. 
 
Pilot Lines 
Pilot operation continued only a year and some months beyond factory project initiation 
and so had minimal cost impact.  A question arises as to whether continued pilot 
operations would have supported process experimentation that ultimately was done in the 
main production line.  If so, economies of terminating off-line pilot operations prior to 
factory start-up may have been false. 
 
R&D 
TF1 was founded on the strength of a significant ongoing combined R&D and 
manufacturing operation in Newtown, Pennsylvania, employing approximately 70 to 80 
people.  Manufacturing operations in Pennsylvania produced a few hundred kW annually 
of 5W single-junction modules for customers who manufactured specialty products like 
livestock fence and recreational vehicle battery chargers.  Arguably, resulting revenue 
covered the manufacturing unit’s share of facility and labor costs, but the need to co-
locate R&D staff with the new factory and the assumption that OEM customers could be 
“converted” to purchase comparable polycrystalline product led to a decision to close the 
Pennsylvania plant and terminate all employees not needed to staff the new factory or the 
scaled-down R&D group at the new factory.  R&D costs in the range of $2M to $3M per 
year continued, along with the one-time cost of relocating relevant personnel and 
equipment.  These costs were not counted against factory revenues but were partially off-
set in early years through cost-sharing participation in DOE/NREL programs.     
 
Downstream Costs 
PV modules account for a major share of installed PV system costs.  Their efficiency and 
value-added features have a major effect on remaining “downstream” costs.  Along with 
module price per watt, two such costs were influential in market acceptance of the 
product line, i.e. the cost of shipping modules to the point of use and the cost of 
incorporating them in a properly functioning system.  
 
Shipping and Packaging 
Shipping costs are typically paid by the PV customer and would be considered in 
evaluating product and supplier offerings.  For Millennia, they varied from an estimated 
$0.02/W for container shipments of laminate products destined for warehousing in 
Rotterdam to an estimated $0.13/W for container shipments of framed products destined 
for India.  Additional shipping costs from distribution warehouse to end use would have 
been incurred in all cases.  It is fair to say that Millennia shipping costs, simply due to 
low power density and low numbers of watts per container, significantly disadvantaged 
Millennia relative to competing higher efficiency products.  It is also noteworthy that 
modules shipped to end customers are often shipped in small quantities, necessitating 
 24
individual packaging at some point.  For Millennia, the incremental cost of single-module 
packaging was several cents per watt more than crate packaging.  
 
Interpretation 
 
Decision Chronology Summary 
 
To summarize, the decisions that influenced manufacturing cost were fundamentally 
market vision and business model choices, not independent manufacturing decisions.   
 
The first decision that influenced manufacturing cost was the decision to target central 
station power applications.  It meant that product features demanded by the existing 
market such as frames, strong glass, and convenient electrical terminations could be 
avoided.   
 
The second decision that influenced manufacturing cost was the decision to offer the 
product in markets where standard crystalline modules were also an option for potential 
customers.  This led to the need to engineer a product having competitive warranties and 
even superior plug-and-play functionality (to offset a portion of the base technology’s 
inherent efficiency penalty).  It also led to the need to offer product options not discussed 
above, including products having a nominal voltage of 12V rather than 48V, products 
having lower ratings typical of competing thin-film and crystalline modules used in 
village solar home systems and other off-grid applications.  It led to the need to engineer 
a product certified for operation in European on-grid applications that had wider strips of 
film removed at the edges to provide proper electrical isolation for modules tested and 
certified for operation in systems designed for up to 1000V (vs. the U.S. National Electric 
Code limit of 600V).  The cost of these products varied – the essential decision in each 
case was to accept the incremental manufacturing (and, in some cases, front- and back-
end process and product development, qualification, and certification) costs in order to 
offer a product having the same or greater value than crystalline and competing thin-film 
offerings. 
 
The third decision that influenced manufacturing cost was, like the second, a decision to 
increase cost as necessary to offer unique value, i.e. the combination of power generation 
and light transmission. 
 
BP Solar’s decision to shut down the factory in late 2002 and its related decision to 
abandon further effort on the technology are also of interest.  These decisions did not 
hinge exclusively on manufacturing costs; rather cost experience was undoubtedly a 
significant factor. 
 
First, there was a decision to abandon the factory, TF1.  For cost reasons, it could not be 
profitably “filled”, i.e. operated at full capacity in response to customer orders, without 
implementing yet another new market vision.  Such a vision probably existed, but it 
probably also would have involved a niche market where small thin-film modules rated at 
5W to 50W could be sold at high enough prices to generate good margins, a market 
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already validated by previous Solarex thin-film manufacturing efforts and by others; and 
a market to which crystalline technology is poorly adapted to compete on cost.  Relative 
to the company’s need at the time to focus on the profitability of its crystalline business 
in the face of strong global competition, this option was probably not considered. 
 
Second, there was a decision to abandon the technology.  This was no doubt also 
influenced by cost, i.e.  failure to validate production costs and product efficiencies that 
would support profitable sales in major market segments.  This failure, which flowed 
from technical limitations of first generation manufacturing equipment and related 
deposition processes, left in its wake no high confidence path to sufficient manufacturing 
scale where attendant off-budget and scale-up costs would be recovered and attractive 
returns on investment could be anticipated.  Clearly, the original strategy of proving and 
then replicating, many times over, a manufacturing line capable of reasonable efficiency 
could no longer be plausibly advocated, even if the owners had not been facing hard 
capital allocation and investment choices.   
 
Cost Change Drivers 
 
How did cost projections change, and what drove the changes?  
 
Material Cost Drivers   
 
Figure 2 summarizes unit material cost projections. 
 
Figure 2.  Unit Material Cost
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Differences in the two preproduction material cost projections (1994 and 1995) were 
discussed earlier.  Increases from 1994 to 1995 were driven by costs of tin oxide-coated 
glass and increases in Germane gas cost and use.  Differences between pre- and post-
production projections were also driven primarily by more realistic assumptions 
regarding yield, and costs of back layer (glass or tedlar), frit, and encapsulant (EVA).  
Germane cost increases were offset by Silane cost decreases.  Further reductions in 
overall specialty gas cost drove the differences between projections made in 1997 and 
1999 for production years 1998 and 2000. 
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Labor and Other Unit Cost Drivers 
 
Table 3 summarizes the increases in various unit cost projections from mid-1995 to late 
1999.  Labor and fixed cost increases, like material cost increases, apparently were driven 
by more realistic yield assumptions as well as lesser influences more difficult to identify 
than material cost drivers.  The factory was not in full stable production during the 
period, so comparison of detailed labor hour and process step yield statistics would not be 
conclusive.   
 
1995 1999 Change
12.88 15.39 19%
25.2 30.62 22%
36.26 47.30 30%
74.34 93.31 26%Total  
Notes:
1.  Includes direct labor and labor overhead
Labor Total (1)
Direct Material
Fixed Cost 
Unframed laminate w/pigtails ($/unit)
Table 3.  Original vs. Experience-Based Cost Estimates  
 
 
Efficiency 
 
The most persistent, and apparently unalterable, difference between realized cost and 
expected cost was actual efficiency vs. projected efficiency. From 1994 onward (see 
Figure 3) efficiency improvement forecasts were updated multiple times, and the 
scenarios for improvement  were consistent from forecast to forecast; yet actually 
realized average efficiency did not change significantly during the roughly 5 years of 
commercial product shipments.   
 
Figure 3.  Efficiency Forecasts 
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Cost Experience Summary 
 
Unit laminate costs (driven by materials and labor) were substantially underestimated 
initially; efficiency shortfalls drove laminate $/Wp costs up further; in parallel, the need 
to meet market requirements by shipping thin-film products technically equivalent to 
accepted and proven crystalline products drove $/Wp costs even higher; finally, value-
added features were incorporated at significant incremental cost.     
 
Cost/Value Trade-off 
 
The above discussion of cost drivers risks reinforcement of a common but overly 
simplistic understanding that all module sales go to the low bidder, based on $/Wp price 
comparison.  It suffices to say that, with PV modules (as with virtually every other 
manufactured product); manufacturing costs can be reduced by sacrificing functionality, 
convenience, quality, durability, operating life, etc.  For example, it is technically very 
challenging to engineer and produce a thin-film module whose actual demonstrated 
lifetime under simulated long-term environmental assault is actually 20 years.  Such a 
product is almost certain to cost more to manufacture than a module that achieves a lesser 
level of qualification.  As is obvious from the above discussion, the evolution of TF1 
product costs was equally and inextricably an evolution in TF1 product value.   
 
Future Cost Reduction 
 
A good place to start in assessing the potential for future cost reduction is cost 
comparisons that were drawn between the two major Solarex module manufacturing 
technologies, i.e. a-Si and polycrystalline.  Figure 4 reflects what would have to be 
regarded as the best-informed view of this comparison at the time (in mid-1997).  It was 
based on world-leading manufacturing experience and hundreds of millions of dollars 
and decades of investment in both technologies; and it was essentially the bottom-line 
rationale for strategic plans, which forecast the eventual eclipse of the company’s 
crystalline manufacturing capacity by its thin-film capacity.   
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Figure 4.  TF and Poly Laminate Costs 
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The favorable scenario hinged on thin-film production scale-up to levels comparable or 
even exceeding polycrystalline.  As presented, the preference appeared decisive, but its 
absolute magnitude was in the range of $0.3/Wp in 2002.  The preceding analysis 
suggests that several factors, or a combination thereof, could negate or reverse this 
advantage. 
 
Could such a comparison like the above still come true?  Perhaps, but much has changed 
on both sides of the comparison.  In particular, crystalline technology and production 
scale have continued to progress in the intervening years while the Solarex a-Si 
technology suffered a devastating setback at the end of 2002, losing both physical assets 
with which to move the technology forward but also losing the organizational capability 
to use them. 
 
Putting aside comparisons, can a-Si manufacturing costs be reduced from the levels 
achieved by Solarex and BP Solar over the next 10-15 years?  Technically yes – it is 
evident from the preceding analysis that original targets were not achieved.  Laminate 
costs exceeded original long-term targets by almost a factor of 2 at the end, but only part 
of the explanation was unrealistic cost targets imbedded in early cost models.  The other 
part of the explanation – failure to achieve more realistic cost targets – can in principle be 
overcome with the expenditure of significant resources.   
 
Recent proposals to undertake such expenditures are by no means revolutionary, but they 
actually mirror the visions and strategies underlying the decade-long effort analyzed 
above.  In early strategic plans, TF1 was viewed as a prototype and precursor of a 
“factory of factories” that would assemble, tune, and qualify “cookie-cutter” lines from 
an ever-improving template, switching to more efficient films as they came out of the 
R&D pipeline, driving capital costs down, and adding automation and a complete process 
to deliver and staff turn-key factories anywhere in the world.  The deployment scale 
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envisioned at the time was comparable to the deployment scale envisioned in more recent 
proposals.  See Figure 5 for the results of this aggressive scenario. 
 
Figure 5.  Factory of Factories Scenario
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Year
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
C
ap
ac
ity
 
(M
W
/y
ea
r)
 
 
If current proposals are basically reincarnations of old proposals that were partially 
implemented, what guidance can be gleaned from the implementation experience? 
 
First, target market validation is essential.  The initial market hypothesis will drive both 
product and factory design; and, if wrong, it will have a crippling effect on subsequent 
efforts.  It will result in a requirement to integrate and coordinate moving targets in too 
many fundamental aspects, i.e. emerging markets, product line reengineering, and factory 
process changes.  Changes in one aspect alone are daunting enough and can be addressed 
relatively quickly, as long as complications and delays in one aspect do not cascade and 
aggravate complications in other aspects.  As noted, TF1 and supporting product 
engineering had to adapt to not just one but two major changes in fundamental market 
requirements (i.e. from a requirement for a single high-voltage, essentially unfinished, 
and relatively fragile laminate product for a single customer) to a requirement for a broad 
line of products functionally equivalent to established product offerings in several diverse 
market segments, back to a single product for a single customer – but one with significant 
value-added features as yet undemonstrated in production or use.  These basic 
redirections set in motion other changes that proliferated and were beyond the capacity of 
even an experienced parent organization to support or smoothly coordinate.   
 
Second, early product introduction and sales can be valuable in smoking out problems, 
but it can also result in damaging and distracting customer and market reactions.  
Technology validation using experimental equipment and pilot lines can only be partial – 
it eliminates a negative theoretical possibility but does not prove a positive operational 
forecast.  Operating a full-scale line without benefit of related revenues involves net costs 
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well beyond the cost of the factory itself.  These costs can only be justified by 
hypothetical revenues from multiple future plants, but they must be accounted for in 
realistic budgets. 
 
Third, because thin-film PV technology challenges are so serious, it is tempting to 
assume that related product engineering, qualification, and certification challenges are not 
of the same importance and can be addressed once a factory is being built.  For example, 
photovoltaic films are especially vulnerable to destruction by moisture ingress; and 
encapsulation strategies consistent with competitive warranties should be developed and 
validated in parallel with film-deposition processes.  The cost of dealing with unresolved 
engineering issues can be significant, i.e. several hundreds of thousands of dollars per 
year, or a few percent of full capacity revenues of a 10MW/year factory.  More 
important, lack of timely resolution can delay production and compromise pricing, with 
far greater negative financial consequences.    
 
Fourth, there are no top-down management fixes when thin-film PV net income forecasts 
turn out to be optimistic.  In the case of TF1, the challenges of unforeseen and 
unavoidable technology, product engineering, factory operations, and marketing changes 
outlined above were compounded by exhaustive consultant and management reviews and 
reorganizations. 
 
Finally, patient capital and significant corporate parental support are truly necessary if 
thin-film commercialization initiatives are to proceed on an aggressive schedule.  Amoco, 
BP, and their crystalline PV business units provided these indispensable ingredients, e.g., 
in the product engineering and legal disciplines, finance, marketing, sales, customer 
service, procurement, logistics, and health and safety.  Capital and corporate 
infrastructure support are necessary but, of course, not sufficient.  Execution of the plan 
is the sufficient condition.  Even so, the importance of the diverse and essential 
organizational and financial resources Amoco and BP made available to TF1 and its 
planning and operations cannot be overstated.25     
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Case Study:  Cadmium Telluride 
 
Apollo Technology – R&D to Production Engineering Phase: 1986 – 1998 
 
1986 to 1996: Acquisition of Apollo Technology and R&D Effort 
 
The Apollo photovoltaic technology project started in 1986 when BP Solar acquired 
patents for CdTe photovoltaic devices from Monosolar Inc. (Santa Monica, California). 
The Monosolar patents described the electrochemical deposition of two semiconductor 
films – cadmium sulfide (CdS) and cadmium telluride (CdTe) – onto a conducting tin 
oxide-coated glass substrate.  
 
BP Solar organized an R&D project at Sunbury (U.K.) named Apollo. The R&D team 
objective was to increase semiconductor efficiency and the size of the photovoltaic 
device using the Monosolar electrochemical process as a starting point. Monosolar 
inventors produced CdTe photovoltaic devices on substrates of a few square inches. 
During the 1987-1996 period, the UK Apollo team developed a computer-controlled 
plating process that deposited CdTe on a 1ft2 (.09m2) substrate, in conjunction with a 
back contact process that relied on conformal coating techniques. The CdS film was 
produced via a thermal-chemical batch reactor process, where elapsed time and rinsing 
controlled the film thickness. The R&D effort eventually culminated in a 1-square-foot 
module with 10% aperture area efficiency (approximately 8 watts).  
 
By the end of the 10-year R&D period, the Apollo technology fundamentals – chemical 
deposition of CdS and CdTe on tin oxide float glass substrate, application of back contact 
coatings, laser ablation of cells, and metallization – were identified and documented for a 
1ft2 substrate using laboratory bench-type equipment. The encapsulation process relied on 
lamination and lead attachment techniques similar to that used by crystalline photovoltaic 
(PV) manufacturers. The R&D processes – and, by implication, the laboratory equipment 
– were documented as the core Apollo technology by 1996 and handed off to the 
Fairfield engineering team. 
 
1994 to 1996: Acquisition of Fairfield Plant and Equipment 
 
The Fairfield (Calif.) plant and equipment were designed by APS Inc. to produce 31” x 
61” (78cm x 155cm) amorphous silicon PV modules using a batch process developed by 
its predecessor company.26 However, APS infringed a Solarex patent in their deposition 
process and, as a result, ceased operation in 1995.27 Subsequently, APS filed for 
bankruptcy, and the Fairfield assets were put up for sale. After a technical audit by BP 
Solar in 1996, it was determined that the Apollo technology could utilize about 50% of 
the APS equipment, primarily in the post-deposition processes. The Fairfield purchase 
was consummated in October 1996. The Fairfield a-Si plant was designed around a high-
vacuum, plasma-deposition batch process. The only “wet material” in use at Fairfield was 
water for incoming glass washing, vacuum pump oil and various solvents used in the 
encapsulation process. 
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1997 to 1998: Technology Transfer, Process Specification, Equipment Procurement, 
and Staffing 
 
Technology Transfer  
In January 1997, a three-person team began the process of transferring the Apollo 
technology from the UK R&D group to Fairfield. During the initial stage of the 
technology transfer process, the team focused on engineering specifications for the 
Apollo process, so that equipment bid specifications could be prepared.  
 
Review of the R&D laboratory process was used to define the cycle time and type – batch 
or continuous – for each manufacturing process step, including load/unload time. The 
manufacturing process was charted for a 14-by-61-inch substrate while taking into 
account existing equipment locations at Fairfield. The 14-inch width was dictated by the 
R&D team findings linked to voltage drop across the substrate during CdTe deposition. 
The 61-inch length for Apollo stemmed from the APS module footprint (31-by-61 inch) 
for existing equipment at Fairfield.  
 
The processing of 0.55m2 (14-by-61 inch) substrates at Fairfield was considered an 
intermediate product from the outset, one that posed little risk for the R&D CdTe 
deposition process. The 0.55m2 module had a nominal 25W rating, which could be used 
for battery charging or in small arrays, but was not viewed as a power module. The 
rationale for producing the 25W module at all was to allow the plant to start operating in 
the shortest time possible, while the Fairfield technology team developed a CdTe 
deposition process for 24-by-61 inch (0.94m2) substrate.  The 24-inch product size 
emerged for several reasons. First, one person could manually handle a 0.94m2 size 
substrate; and a module could be handled by a two-person team, from a weight 
perspective. Second, off-the-shelf coating equipment to process 24-inch wide materials 
was judged to be widely available. Third, the R&D and Fairfield team had reason to 
believe the CdTe deposition technology could be pressed to accommodate 24-inch 
substrate, but larger widths presented significant technical risks; and, further, the plating 
tank size necessary to process 5-across 14-inch substrates could dimensionally 
accommodate 3-up 24-inch substrates. Finally, the deposition equipment would “fit” onto 
the Fairfield plant floor along with a second CdTe deposition train at a later time. From 
the outset, therefore, the technology transfer team considered the ramification of a larger 
substrate in preparing the specification for new equipment.  
 
Process Specification 
The translation of the R&D process for 0.09m2 substrates posed substantial challenges. 
The intermediate 0.55m2 substrate presented engineering challenges for even relatively 
simple heat-treat steps. Time-temperature profiles for manufacturing-size convection 
ovens had to be developed from the R&D bench-type ovens. Questions arose about ramp 
rates, soak time, cool-down, and surface temperature uniformity across single substrates 
of a “load” comprised of about 20 substrates in a batch, laminar flow oven. Such 
parameters had not been explicitly considered on the R&D level, presumably because the 
small 0.09m2 plate load did not elicit any fundamental technology questions.  
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Scale and edge effects were encountered in other processes as well. The CdS deposition 
process in R&D, for example, was based on “manual stirring” by a technician as two 
aqueous solutions were poured into a deep bench tank, followed by manual insertion of a 
small rack of CTO glass. At Fairfield the two solutions (cadmium-base and chelating) 
would be pumped into a reaction chamber many times larger, air would “stir” the 
solutions, followed by immersion of the substrate load weighing hundreds of pounds 
from a hoist. The batch reaction process requirements were carefully calculated, and then 
converted into equipment specifications for high-volume manufacturing. Similar scale 
issues were addressed across many other processes. 
 
Equipment 
When the engineering specifications were judged as complete, equipment procurement 
was initiated, which took place during the 1997-1998 period.28 The approach taken was 
to obtain a modified version of “off-the-shelf” equipment from original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) in order to minimize equipment design and delivery time. The 
main exception to this approach was the procurement of the CdS and CdTe reactors, each 
of which were one-off or engineer-to-order (ETO) pieces of equipment. The design and 
construction of the requisite Apollo deposition equipment by the selected OEM required 
considerable input from Fairfield’s technology/engineering team. A prototype CdTe 
reactor was made prior to delivery of the main system to test the internal components. 
This unit had one eighth of the capacity of the main CdTe train and was operated in a 
semi-manual mode. However, the internal components and structure were identical in 
design to the production line. By July 1998, all equipment was in place, including the 
single CdTe prototype tank, so that process qualification trials could take place. 
 
Recruitment of Technical Staff 
As the Apollo project got underway at Fairfield in 1997, there was great demand for 
scientists, engineers and other skilled personnel throughout the “Bay” area in northern 
California. Initially, recruitment of technical staff was limited to the local region. It was 
quickly determined that personnel availability in northern California was inadequate for 
the proposed compensation levels; and sometimes qualified candidates simply could not 
be identified almost regardless of salary. 
 
Apollo Technology – Legacy Manufacturing Plan: Circa 1997 – 1999 
 
1997 Manufacturing Vision – Apollo Modules @ η ~ 5.5 – 6.5%:29 Initially, Apollo 
manufacturing volume was planned under the assumption that only supply constrained its 
consumption in the market. That is, if the Fairfield plant was capable of producing stable 
25Wp modules over the 1998 to 1999 period, they would all be sold. Following on in 
2000, if Fairfield produced stable 50Wp modules, they too would all be sold as well. The 
Apollo technology/engineering start-up team was convinced that the various equipment 
and process challenges were manageable, and that the endeavor would constitute a major 
breakthrough in thin-film module manufacturing. The Apollo team benefited from 
abundant offers of corporate support at the outset, which was usually forthcoming in 
disciplines such as financial, legal, purchasing and community relations.  
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Based on the outdoor experience of the R&D findings, the Fairfield team expected about 
6% light-soak degradation by the Apollo module.  The initial efficiency target in 
manufacturing was 5.9% for the 0.55m2 unit and 6.6% for the 0.94m2 unit, resulting in 
stabilized efficiency on order of 5.5% and 6.2%, respectively. The module features were 
straightforward – annealed glass to glass lamination using EVA, U-channel brackets, J-
box connector, and 16AWG red/black wire harness suitable for interconnection in an 
array. These module features were those employed by APS for the a-Si 500kW array 
built for the PVUSA project. These encapsulation processes and equipment were carried 
over at Fairfield.  
 
The manufacturing plan for the period 1998-2000 identified a number of risks that could 
impede the rapid start-up of Apollo production. These risks included the following: 
1. Engineering Staff – timely recruitment within salary guidelines for essential 
engineering and other technical personnel needed for line start-up;  
2. New Process Equipment – procured in reference to the cost estimates originally 
developed by the R&D team; this applied to both modified “off-the-shelf” 
equipment as well as the one-off, special-purpose deposition reactors and 
associated fixtures; 
3. Facility Overhaul – modifications to accommodate multiple wet chemical 
manufacturing processes and supporting infrastructure; 
4. Hazardous Waste and Environmental Control Equipment – retention of chemical 
solutions under normal and catastrophic conditions, spent solution capture and on-
site/off-site treatment of hazardous chemicals, volatile organic compounds 
(VOC), and other materials (direct and indirect); securing necessary permits and 
approvals from local, regional, and state agencies; 
5. Fairfield Equipment – modified or reconditioned to handle Apollo substrates and 
modules; legacy equipment of interest included glass washers, automated 
load/unload laser stations, metal sputtering unit, and encapsulation equipment 
such as EVA applicator, buss foil applicator, laminators, bracket applicator, 
laminate/bracket curing ovens, and conveyors; 
6. Operator and Technician – timely recruitment from local labor pool and specific 
training, including skilled maintenance and process technicians; 
7. Product and Process Reliability – reliance on earlier R&D studies, especially 
outdoor test array data, to forecast long term module electrical and environmental 
performance. 
 
Start-up Challenges, Risk Management, and Revised Vision: 1997 – 1999: As it 
turned out, some of the aforementioned risks were significant drivers of project 
performance, either with respect to resource consumption, creation of major delays in the 
project timeline, or both. There was no expectation that new significant technology 
enhancements would be required for success. 
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Technical Staff   
Recruitment of engineering and technology staff was extremely challenging. The speedy 
recruitment of senior technology and engineering personnel in the local region was not 
successful. The overall project plan called for all new engineering staff, plus three 
“transfer” members from other units, to be onboard by April 1997; installation of all 
essential process equipment by the end of 1997; and start of qualification trials in early 
1998.  
 
The reality turned out differently. The first engineer was hired in May 1997, and the last 
came onboard in September 1997. Once assembled, however, the team charged ahead 
with the technical challenges. Higher than budget relocation costs and higher-than-
planned salaries aside, the greater impact was a delay in acquiring, installing and 
qualifying process equipment; and in managing the extensive facility renovations. The 
start-up expenditure was set at about $200,000 per month. Hence, the delay in starting up 
the Apollo manufacturing line beyond the planned period (early 1998) was very costly.  
 
Deposition Equipment 
The Apollo CdS and CdTe deposition reactors were unique. In terms of scale, the batch 
reactors were quite large. In terms of equipment construction, the CdTe electro-chemical 
reactor required significant alignment precision, which is not normally associated with 
large and heavy substrates in a chemical bath. Alignment of the mass transport 
mechanism with the substrates and transport racks proved to be very difficult in terms of 
material selection and fabrication. Further, both types of reactors involved large thermal 
loads and the need to closely control the temperature profile. 
 
In 1997, there were very few original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with the 
requisite engineering and fabrication expertise needed for designing and constructing the 
sort of very large deposition reactors necessary for the Apollo process. The Apollo team 
identified a handful of firms in the USA. One was eliminated because all construction 
was done in the Far East, which would lead to excessive project and engineering 
oversight costs. A second company disqualified itself because they were located on the 
East Coast. The remaining three OEMs were in the Los Angeles area.  
 
Three bids were solicited, but only two firms responded. The first bidder had marginal 
experience in manufacturing large-scale, automated chemical batch reactors at the time, 
and their bid was judged inadequate. The second OEM submitted a quote that 
demonstrated reasonably good technical understanding, and the proposed cost was close 
to that originally estimated by the R&D team. The third company, when pressed to 
submit a bid, said they would only consider a time and materials (T&M) design project 
for one year to come up with a design of what was needed, and the charges for the 
engineering effort would be equal to the second firm’s bid for finished reactors. 
 
The second OEM was awarded the contract for the CdS and CdTe deposition units in 
June 1997. The CdS deposition unit was delivered in December 1997 per the contract. 
The CdTe deposition system proved much more difficult. After many months, a special 
project manager and a mechanical engineer were assigned full-time to work on-site at the 
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OEM’s place of business. In the end, the CdTe unit was delivered in August 1998 at a 
cost about double the original bid, and only prototype fixtures for one of the eight tank 
trains were provided. To fit out the other 7 tank fixtures, additional cost on order of 
another 50% was required.30  
 
Facility Overhaul 
The modifications needed to convert the “dry” Fairfield facility to accept the wet 
chemical processes for Apollo were challenging in several respects. Channels and 
conduits had to be cut into a solid concrete floor, along with discharge pipes to 
“catchment” tanks where pumps were needed to convey the spent solutions to a treatment 
facility especially designed to handle cadmium wastewater. Concurrently, various gas 
byproducts from processes involving hazardous gases and solvents had to be captured by 
flow hoods and conveyed to scrubber systems. Chemical holding tanks, containment 
dikes and seismic tie-downs were needed where yet-to-be-acquired process equipment 
was to be installed. Due to the large thermal load of the Apollo process, a new multistage 
boiler had to be fitted, along with significant upgrades for DI water service, compressed 
air, electrical drops, and air handling systems. Coordination of the various trades was 
daunting, as up to a dozen subcontractors were on-site along with crews numbering 
several dozen at times. Original estimates to put these new services in place were 
exceeded by wide margins as existing services had to be removed, in most cases, in order 
to install the new services. Moreover, the extremely short project timeline required 
reliance on design-to-build (DTB) contracts, as opposed to specification and firm fix-
price quotations. DTB contracts can save time, but are generally more expensive and 
difficult to manage. An outside construction management firm was employed. Overall, 
the facility upgrades exceeded “stand-alone” construction estimates by about 100%.31
 
Hazardous Waste and Environmental Control Equipment  
The project effort to identify, characterize, quantify and treat the hazardous waste by-
products of the Apollo process was handled in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. 
There were a number of antecedents leading up to this outcome. First, the R&D team had 
carefully noted and documented the hazardous wastes produced in their UK laboratory, in 
response to strict corporate health, safety and environmental (HS) guidelines. Second, the 
UK member of the technology transfer team was well informed regarding the hazards 
associated with the Apollo process since he was the site HSE officer. Third, the Fairfield 
team was able to engage a BP pre-qualified environmental engineering firm in the Bay 
area. The environmental firm’s study of hazardous-waste treatment was funded, in part, 
under a subcontract with NREL. Fourth, the first engineer hired at Fairfield was a quality-
control specialist for a major chemical manufacturer and, as such, was very 
knowledgeable as to chemical hazards, waste treatment suppliers, and applicable 
regulations. In short, the requisite expertise, staff resources, and funding quickly fell into 
place.  
 
The authority to construct (ACT) permit for air emission abatement equipment was 
issued in July 1997 by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). 
Following discussions with the local sewer district, the wastewater stream treatment prior 
to discharge was identified and established. All necessary environmental control 
 37
equipment was ordered, installed, and qualified by mid-year 1998. There were no cost 
upsets, and permits to operate were eventually secured for start-up. 
 
Fairfield Equipment 
Renovation of existing APS equipment was scheduled on an “as-needed” basis over the 
years 1997-2000. The most significant upgrades, in terms of cost, involved the laser-
ablation stations. By 2000, the existing Fairfield laser technology had insufficient power 
and other optical properties to reliably scribe Apollo substrates. The semiconductor and 
back contact material were considerably thicker in Apollo than that used by APS to 
produce a-Si material. Further, the use of tempered CTO substrates introduced flatness 
variations that necessitated beam optics with larger depth of field. The cost to upgrade all 
the laser stations and respective controllers was approximately $250,000 in 2001. Other 
“legacy” Fairfield equipment, such as glass washers and laminators, necessitated 
overhaul to replace aged parts, which was accomplished at modest cost within routine 
maintenance budgets. The buss foil applicator for a-Si APS modules was not usable for 
Apollo despite best efforts, eventually leading to the adoption of foil-tape prior to 1999, 
and then conversion to frit buss bars derivative of the parallel a-Si factory (Toano, 
Virginia). Other general-purpose conveyors and worktables were used as is. The edge-
deletion equipment received a major overhaul to significantly enhance capture of ablated 
material, so as to trap cadmium particles. The metal sputtering system was used as is, 
although the metal target materials were modified over time to enhance performance of 
Apollo modules. 
 
Operator and Technician Recruitment; & Product and Process Reliability 
As it turned out, the first phase of the Apollo project from 1997-1998Q3 was mainly 
concerned with proving that the Apollo CdS-CdTe deposition equipment was capable of 
depositing a semiconductor film on large substrates. By the end of 1998Q2 the Apollo 
team was satisfied with the back contact process based upon studies using CdTe coated 
substrates from another company. Corporate leadership change in late 1997 did lead to 
inquiries regarding the financial and market underpinnings for the Apollo project. The 
earlier “supply constrained” premise did not survive close scrutiny by new marketing 
staff at Fairfield. There were new questions as to the technical feasibility of the Apollo 
CdTe deposition train. Responses to such questions were difficult in early 1998, as the 
equipment had not been delivered, much less installed and qualified. The financial 
viability of the Apollo enterprise was thoroughly analyzed with respect to alternative 
scenarios and their inherent risks. While the top-down management review was taking 
place, the Fairfield technical team continued efforts to improve the process, albeit with 
only a single prototype CdTe reactor.  
 
The recruitment of a full complement of operators and technicians was set aside for the 
moment. Product reliability and environmental studies were also limited since Apollo 
CdTe deposition equipment was not yet installed at Fairfield. Both recruitment and 
product evaluation tasks became more consequential in the third phase of the Apollo 
project, following after the 1999 efficiency stretch and the Apollo commercialization 
stage-gate in June 2000. 
 
 38
Beginning in 1998Q2 the fabrication and assembly of the 8-tank CdTe deposition system 
was assigned to a special engineering team comprised of a senior project manager from 
BP, senior chemistry technologists from UK and Fairfield, and a Fairfield mechanical 
engineer. All members of this team were expected to work on site at the company 
building the CdTe deposition system.  
 
The balance of the Apollo engineering and technology team continued efforts to refine 
and qualify the post-deposition processes. Progress in the development of the lamination 
and encapsulation process was limited as the appropriate engineering positions were not 
on board as yet. The installation of the equipment to control hazardous waste materials 
was continued. 
 
Apollo Technology – Stage-Gate and Efficiency Stretch: 1998Q3 – 2000Q2 
 
Stage-Gate #1: Equipment Capabilities – CdTe Prototype Reactor (Oct, 1998) 
The first stage-gate demonstration was undertaken in October 1998. While awaiting the 
completion and delivery of the eight-pack CdTe deposition system, it was important to 
determine whether the prototype reactor unit was capable of depositing a CdTe film over 
the CTO-CdS substrate. As mentioned above, the OEM supplied a prototype reactor 
chamber that was expected to be the same as the 8 chambers in the production unit when 
delivered. There was a certain level of concern associated with the CdTe system, ranging 
from the mundane – did it leak cadmium solution – to the sophisticated – was a 
stoichiometric CdTe film deposited in the reactor – and the momentous – did the CdTe 
film exhibit semiconductor properties. The principal scientists responsible for the design 
of the CdTe reactor system carried out the demonstration. After several weeks, the 
prototype reactor performed as expected, albeit with much “hands-on” input by the 
scientists. 
 
Stage-Gate #2: Process Capabilities – CdTe Prototype Reactor (Jan. 1999)  
The second stage-gate demonstration was completed in January 1999. Shortly after the 
October stage-gate was completed, the full eight-pack CdTe deposition train was 
delivered and services connected. At this juncture, however, the individual reactor 
chambers were not completely fitted out. The decision was made to accept the equipment 
as is, because the OEM had been struggling with the build for some months. Before funds 
were released to completely fit out the eight-pack, it was important to demonstrate that 
the CdTe electrochemical process in the fitted-out prototype reactor was capable of 
producing viable product. The second stage-gate targets for a 200-plate lot included 
efficiency (average η ≥ 6% & std dev ≤ 0.7%), overall yield (≥ 80%) and related results.. 
This stage-gate was successfully completed.32
 
Stage-Gate #3: Process Capabilities – CdTe 8-Pack Reactor (April 1999) 
The third stage-gate demonstration dealt with the eight-pack CdTe reactor and its process 
capability. The stage-gate #3 pass criteria were identical to those of stage-gate 2. Stage-
gate #3 was successfully completed in April 1999. 
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Up to this point, the Fairfield team was working toward the start-up of the 0.55m2 Apollo 
line in 1999. With the merger of BP Solar with Solarex, new questions were raised, 
namely, “which thin-film process had the best hopes for commercial success – the Apollo 
cadmium telluride at Fairfield, California, or the Millennia amorphous silicon at Toano, 
Virginia?” After technical discussions and exchanges of cost and performance data, it 
was concluded that neither thin-film technology had a clear cost advantage or a 
performance advantage as both produced modules with aperture efficiencies on the order 
of 6%. However, as the Toano plant was further along in terms of its production rollout, 
the Fairfield process became the “challenger” technology. The Apollo technology had to 
demonstrate a clear advantage in terms of product performance or cost in order to 
survive. 
 
The Fairfield team was given a mandate to undertake an “efficiency stretch” project for 
the 0.94m2 Apollo module, with the goal to significantly boost module power at a cost 
that demonstrated a clear and convincing comparative advantage. The Fairfield team 
sought the advice and assistance of the NREL thin-film staff as well as the scientists at 
the Institute of Energy Conversion at the University of Delaware. Both organizations 
provided excellent technical advice and supporting analyses that were extremely useful in 
progressing the Apollo CdTe technology at Fairfield. 
 
Stage-Gate #4: High Efficiency > 6% Process Capabilities – CdTe 8-Pack Reactor 
(Sept. 1999) 
The fourth stage-gate demonstration looked at the production of 0.94m2 substrates with 
efficiencies in excess of 6% (~ 50Wp). At this stage, only the eight-pack reactor 
equipment was utilized. Based on supporting studies by NREL and IEC research 
scientists, the Apollo process team began looking at ways to improve the performance of 
the CdTe absorber layer. A post-deposition process was developed to facilitate grain 
growth, which resulted in overall module efficiency going from 6% to about 7% or 
~60Wp with the 0.94m2 size module.33 The stage-gate 4 pass criteria were similar to 
those for stage-gate 3, and were successfully completed in September 1999. 
 
Stage-Gate #5: High Efficiency > 7% Capabilities – CdTe 8-Pack Reactor (Dec. 
1999) 
The fifth stage-gate demonstration looked exclusively at the production of 0.94m2 
substrates with efficiencies in excess of 8% (~70Wp). This stage-gate addressed the 
stability of the Apollo module over 500 hours of light soak under load at controlled 
temperature (50°C ± 5°C) and irradiance (800w/m2 ± 5%).34 Stage-gate 5 was attained in 
December 1999. 
 
Stage-Gate #6: Very High Efficiency ~10% Capabilities – CdTe 8-Pack Reactor 
(April 2000) 
The sixth stage-gate demonstration looked at the production of 0.94m2 substrates with 
efficiencies in excess of 8% (~70Wp). The technical challenge was to reduce the losses in 
the window or CdS layer. This was achieved by reducing the thickness of the CdS layer 
without compromising the electrical properties of the semiconductor. A process was 
developed whereby a high-resistance layer was placed over the CTO prior to CdS 
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deposition. The CdS layer thickness was reduced by about half, which allowed more blue 
light to pass through to the CdTe layer and increased the quantum efficiency of the 
Apollo device. Module efficiency on order of 10% (~85Wp) was achieved for a 
significant number of units. This stage-gate was achieved in April 2000. 
 
Stage-Gate #7: Commercialization of VHE Apollo Modules (June 2000)  
This stage- gate was anticipated with eagerness by the Apollo technology team. The 
meeting was organized in June 2000 and involved marketing and corporate staff for the 
first time in many months. A number of issues were discussed, including the status of the 
technology, manufacturing capability, staff needs, product qualification and production 
ramp plan.  
 
The outcome of the meeting was a directive to develop an overall business plan including 
product specification and qualification, manufacturing costs, staffing, capital expenditure, 
manufacturing ramp plan, sales forecast, and product stewardship plan. The next section 
will discuss the cost and schedule consequences that emanated from the 
commercialization strategy discussions. 
 
Commercialization and Manufacturing: 2000 – 2002 
 
Manufacturing Process Changes for 10% Modules: 
The Apollo process and technology had evolved during the previous two and a half years 
as the result of the efficiency stretch improvements. The manufacturing process to 
produce modules with 10% efficiency (or 80 watts) had grown in complexity, however, 
through the introduction of new materials, new handling steps, and new equipment.  
 
Figure 6 presents a simplified schematic for the “10% efficiency” Apollo process, which 
was expected to yield “80Wp modules” on average, as well as improved reliability. The 
efficiency gains involved process steps #02, #03, #05 and #07 in the schematic. 
Reliability gains came from change to heat strengthened glass (#01) and use of vapor 
barrier (#14). The schematic is simplified in that only 16 macro-processes are broken out. 
Underlying each of the 16 macro-processes is a bundle of discrete processes, numbering 
in excess of 42 to produce a glass-to-glass laminate. These 42 processes, in turn, do not 
reflect other offline procedures such as preparing solutions, process control 
measurements, operation of environmental control equipment, equipment setup and 
teardown, and similar procedures. Moreover, the 42 discrete procedures do not include 
the steps required to build the other module types (e.g., frame) desired by product 
managers. 
 
As displayed in Figure 6, there were three major process subsets at Fairfield, namely 
Deposition Process (#01 - #08), Back Contact Process (#09 - #13) and Module Process 
(#14 - #16). A fourth major process subset – Environmental Control – is not depicted, but 
was just as critical to the successful operation of the Apollo manufacturing line. 
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Specific engineers and technicians were assigned principal areas of responsibility, but 
everyone was expected to participate in daily and weekly meetings to troubleshoot yield, 
quality or performance shortfalls. Root cause and corrective action initiatives were daily 
occurrences as the manufacturing line began to ramp in 2001. As discussed later, line 
yield and environmental stress reliability matters consumed significant engineering, 
technology and production staff resources. 
 
The process changes to improve aperture efficiency came at a cost in almost every 
circumstance, either in terms of material, direct labor or handling, cycle times, or new 
equipment. The type and approximate impact of the major changes are summarized 
below. 
 
Process #02 Sputter HR Buffer Layer – this new process added nominal material costs for 
sputtered metal and masking tape. The more significant cost was higher direct labor costs 
and a bottleneck at the sputtering system station. The bottleneck eventually would 
impinge on capacity. The direct cost of the HR buffer layer at low volumes was roughly 
$0.02 – 0.03 per W or $2/m2, and a scheduling workaround challenge.  
 
Process #03 CdS Deposition – thinner window (CdS) layer was accomplished by using a 
shorter cycle time; which, in theory, lowered direct labor – but the resulting labor 
efficiency gain was minimal.  
 
 
#01 #02 #03 #04
Glass Wash & Inspect Thermal Clean CdS Deposition CdS Heat Treat
Sputter HR Layer
#08 #07 #06 #05
Surface Etch & CdTe Grain Growth CdTe Heat Treat CdTe Deposition
Cu Doping & Heat Treat
#09 #10 #11 #12
Laser 1 Cell Isolation Insulation/ Laser 2 Isolation Sputter
Back Contact Film Metal Interconnect
#16 #15 #14 #13
Final Inspection Encapsulation Edge Delete/ Laser 3 Isolation
Vapor Barrier
Major Process Upgrade
Deposition Process
Back Contact
Module Process
Figure 6. APOLLO SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW - 10% EFFICIENCY [80Wp] 
Color Key
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Process #05 CdTe Deposition – the efficiency stretch program concluded that a thicker 
CdTe layer improved device performance, which required a longer deposition cycle, and 
reduced plant capacity in units by approximately 25%. While the unit reduction was 
offset by higher electrical yields, it was concluded that fixed cost per unit or watt was 
adversely affected, and ways to shorten the CdTe cycle time were under consideration. 
 
Process #07 CdTe Grain Growth – this process change had nominal material costs, but 
did require the addition of equipment costing about $300,000 and required more energy.  
The depreciation cost per watt was minimal at the targeted eight megawatt (8 MW) run 
rate.  
 
Other Cost Impacts 
There was a major unplanned cost upset during the 2000-01 period. It appeared as an 
extraordinary rise in the price of electricity in California.  Due to a breakdown in the 
power delivery system in California, early forecasts indicated that utility costs on order of 
$0.07-0.10 per watt ($5 - $8 per m 2) would be incurred at full-run rate. Investigations of 
how best to offset higher utility costs were set in motion, including installation of a large 
grid-connected Apollo array at the Fairfield site.  
 
Product Plan and Impact 
Following onto the commercialization stage-gate in June 2000, the Apollo venture came 
under the auspices of corporate gatekeepers for product design.  
 
Heat-Strengthened Glass 
One product design requirement was the use of heat-strengthened glass in the Apollo 
product. The Fairfield engineering team ran small lots through the deposition and 
encapsulation line. Fully tempered 0.55m2 (14” x 61”) CTO glass lost about 50% of its 
surface compression, thereby falling into the heat-strengthen (HS) range (≤ 10k psi) after 
going through the Apollo process. Module electrical performance was acceptable. Other 
tests with HS rear glass (14-by-61 inches) indicated lower adhesion and some bubbles 
after lamination. Other process issues with heat-strengthened glass did eventually 
emerge. 
 
With the above HS test results in hand, it was judged that CTO substrates could be 
tempered concurrent with “firing the frit buss” with modest additional costs based upon 
discussions with TF1 staff and their supplier. One alternative for the frit-buss – metal foil 
with two-sided tape -- was unreliable under environmental stress conditions. The product 
management team requested a cost comparison for annealed CTO and rear cover glass, 
tempered CTO and annealed rear cover glass, and tempered CTO and HS rear cover 
glass.35 The approximate and initial cost differences are presented in Figure 7.  The cost 
estimates for the HS-CTO and HS-Rear glass were guesstimates from the glass fabricator 
who would process truckloads with racks of annealed tin-oxide coated (CTO or TEC) and 
annealed clear (CLR) glass as shipped from the LOF float glass foundry. 
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Figure 7. ANNEALED vs. HEAT-STRENGTHEN CTO & REAR 
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The base case – Annealed CTO and Annealed Rear – glass costs in the chart ($21/m2) 
were gathered from local and internal sources. Subsequently, base case costs for 
annealed/annealed units were underestimated by 30% or so, while the HS/HS 
configuration costs were about 5% lower overall. All-inclusive quotes from the glass 
fabricator for scribing the CTO glass to size, edge seaming, washing, drying and racking 
for shipment to Fairfield was about $2.50/m2. The “low ohm” CTO glass used at Fairfield 
was priced by LOF at about $15/m2 for modest truckload quantities. For CLR glass, the 
raw glass with seamed edges was about $9/m2 (vs. $3/m2 as originally thought using in-
house seaming process). 
 
With the HS-CTO product, in addition to the cutting and seaming operations, the 
fabricator had to dispense conductive frit ($6/m2) and cure the frit ($4/m2) while 
tempering the CTO. Tempering the CTO glass, with one clear side and the other being 
tin-oxide coated, while holding flatness and compression specifications across the 
0.945m2 surface turned out to be a technology challenge for the fabricator and eventually 
a cost upset. Gaining agreement on how to measure surface compression using non-
destructive means was difficult using available instrumentation. The HS process with 
CLR glass was more straightforward. A significant cost variable was the yield loss at the 
fabricator level. Over time it was anticipated that higher volume and more robust process 
control by the fabricator would secure lower unit costs, on order of 5 – 10% perhaps. 
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Despite the large “guesstimated” cost differences, it was decided to proceed with the HS-
CTO and HS-Rear glass for Apollo because it was thought the final product would have 
greater acceptance and field reliability.36
 
Product Stewardship 
Another issue considered by the Apollo Commercialization team was the question of 
product stewardship.  At the Fairfield plant, substantial technical and financial resources 
were devoted to the abatement of environmental risks. The Fairfield plant had gained 
environmental (ISO 14001) certification. All employees were instructed regarding the 
proper methods and personal safety gear required by each operation where there was 
some risk of exposure to cadmium feedstock, as well as other safety and environmental 
hazards. The feedstock was present as cadmium solutions inside equipment hoods with 
separate air handling gear, which went a long way toward reducing workforce exposure. 
Early engineering studies concluded that finished modules and post-lamination line scrap 
easily passed the Toxic Characteristic Leach Procedure tests established by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which meant such scrap could go into ordinary 
municipal landfills except in California. All Fairfield line scrap was disposed of as 
hazardous waste.  
 
The issue of handling Apollo modules was addressed once again in anticipation of high-
volume Fairfield manufacturing, and the shipping of large quantities of Apollo modules 
around the country and, in time, throughout the world. In general, the marketing plan for 
Apollo was to seek out partners who were large grid-connected installers. Preferably, 
these commercial arrangements would take place for projects of 50kW or greater. By 
limiting the distribution channels, it was thought the handling and return of scrap Apollo 
modules to the Fairfield plant could be achieved in an economic manner. Once reaching 
the Fairfield plant, any scrapped modules would be properly disposed.  
 
Environmental standards were evolving and it was concluded that a “cradle-to-grave” 
(vs.” cradle-to-cradle” advocated by some) stewardship program would be initiated.37 On 
the basis of very preliminary cost estimates to ship modules from, say, India to 
California, warehousing and transit costs to a smelter operation where the scrap modules 
would be used as flux, an accrual charge of $0.05 - 0.15/Wp ($4 - $12/m2) may be 
necessary as a stewardship cost. A project was organized to scope the handling of local 
Apollo scrap and future material returns. Discussions were initiated with a smelter 
operator in the northwest. 
 
Manufacturing Ramp Plan 
The Apollo manufacturing line incorporated some major upgrades in terms of existing 
equipment, as well as the purchase and installation of new material handling and process 
equipment to improve operational efficiencies. Also, the eight-pack CdTe system had to 
be completely fitted out as only one tank had been upgraded for the efficiency stretch 
quest.  
 
As the new equipment was brought onboard, the limitations of certain facility services 
also came into play. Upgrades to services such as boiler water distribution, pneumatic 
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distribution, DI water and electrical services were initiated. The environmental abatement 
equipment also was upgraded in certain areas. Additional quality-control equipment for 
assessing deposition solutions, as well as wastewater streams became critical. The 
encapsulation line also required an influx of new (e.g., inline IV tester) equipment and 
the refurbishment of other equipment.  
 
The encapsulation process and equipment capabilities were particularly significant as 
product qualification tests were undertaken. The glass-to-glass Apollo module, using HS 
substrate and rear glass, failed the 1,000-hour damp heat (1000hr DH) test. The newly 
hired encapsulation engineers had to identify a new edge and wire hole vapor barrier 
process to protect the Apollo thin-film, which was predisposed to moisture induced 
corrosion. Annealed glass off a float line is typically very flat. The HS process for glass 
introduces stresses that can introduce curvature onto the surface of the glass. A glass-
glass laminate configuration will typically result in “gaps” between the CTO side and the 
Rear side. These edge gaps permitted ingression of water vapor that attacked the thin-film 
material and eventually lead to performance degradation in the module. Working closely 
with a specialty adhesives and sealants company, an extruded butyl sealant material was 
developed that, and once applied along the edge of the glass-glass laminate, acted to 
prevent DH failures through the edges. Another material was developed for the wire-hole 
pottant where leads were soldered to the conductive frit. The challenge here was to 
identify a material(s) that was impervious to water vapor, firmly encapsulate the wire 
solder interconnect and yet be flexible enough to not break the solder connection at the 
frit surface during thermal cycles. The vapor barrier process was a critical path item 
before a general product introduction was possible.  
 
While the moisture barrier effort was underway, corporate product engineering 
simultaneously wanted to qualify various framed module configurations for Apollo. The 
framed module effort added greatly to the workload of Apollo encapsulation engineering 
staff.  In addition to the major tasks associated with overcoming DH failures, Apollo 
technology staff was also instructed to consider new EVA material. A 1,000-hour damp 
heat test cycle lasted 6 weeks. Consequently, the conduct of dozens of test samples in 
various test cycles in test chambers at Fairfield, at Frederick MD site, and local 
environmental test houses kept several engineers and quality staff on their toes. 
 
The fitting out of the eight-pack tank fixtures (e.g., mass transport comb) was also a 
considerable task. To accelerate final installation, an outside contractor was hired to 
organize a rigging and fitting crew. This process took several months to complete. Final 
installation of the tank fixtures had to take place inside the CdTe deposition reactor. 
Special safeguards were implemented to protect the installation team, as regular 
processing of test substrates was ongoing. Once a tank was fitted out, a process to plate 
out impurities was scheduled, which sometimes took a week or more. This was followed 
with qualification lots before the tanks were placed in service. The tank startup timeline 
extended over several months.  
 
In addition to the hiring of several engineers and technicians in the last half of 2000, full 
production meant the hiring and training of 50-60 production employees. Attracting 
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prospective process operators and technicians was woefully inadequate during the first 
quarter of 2001. Based on the advice of outside agencies, the starting rate for production 
employees was raised by about 10% across the board. This had an impact on labor costs; 
but, spread across all cost centers, it was not a major hit at the time. The generic answer 
to avoid higher unit costs was generally to ramp the planned volume and, hopefully, 
observe a corresponding change in units going to stores.   
 
The Fairfield line began commercial operation in August 2001. Almost immediately, the 
line began to encounter difficulties with respect to yields. Some shakedown is always 
anticipated with start-up, but the yield losses increased right along with efforts to bring 
more CdTe tanks on line. The largest yield loss was at the CdTe deposition process either 
immediately as a visual defect (e.g., incomplete deposition) or later at IV test following 
the back contact process. Additional losses occurred in the encapsulation line due to 
electrical or visual failures, including excessive bubbles entrapped in the laminate, 
misalignment of top/bottom covers, appearance, and the like.  
 
By the end of 2001, the cumulative line yield was only one-half of plan (65%), which 
was initially judged as being a reasonable target. The overall cost impact of the excessive 
yield loss is unknown, but a reasonable guesstimate would be about $0.35/Wp or about 
$30/m2. This is a shocking cost increase, of course, and the entire technology and 
engineering team spent countless hours battling to regain control of line yield. 
Interestingly, studies of process variations did not suggest that the equipment was not 
working or was set-up incorrectly. Rather, the largest defect was visual at CdTe 
deposition, followed by electrical losses. The process finally achieved target yield at the 
end of January 2002, and operated until November 2002, when the line was shut-in. 
 
Thin-Film Costs  
 
The cost to manufacture thin-film PV product has several major components as outlined 
above for the TF1 experience. Estimating the cost of manufacturing thin-film modules 
across a number of different companies during the past decade or so, there seems to be a 
striking similarity for the direct materials used in each instance, as well as direct-labor, 
manufacturing overhead and so-called fixed costs, such as plant management, 
engineering, facility costs, and assigned central support (HR, accounting, administration). 
Based on several production cost benchmark exercises for TF1 and Fairfield, the Apollo 
cost model developed for financial planning and forecasting purposes was similar to that 
for Millennia (TF1), not withstanding large differences in the fundamental technologies 
and how the thin-film device was produced. 
 
One key driver to reducing unit costs, thereby moving closer to positive gross margin, 
was always higher module efficiency or peak watts (Wp) – the higher the Wp, the greater 
the divisor in any financial projection and the lower the unit cost. A second key driver for 
financial planning was greater volume of production, and the sooner the better, in order to 
spread sizable fixed plant, equipment and manufacturing support costs on per unit basis. 
A third cost driver is line yield usually followed by line efficiency and lower material 
costs. The planning analyst objective was usually focused on the “hockey stick” 
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production ramp, thus achieving the more “straightforward” and less “technical” cost 
reduction. The volume-is-easy perception is often misplaced as greater volume during 
start-up oft times can dissipate the engineering focus and efficacy by introducing too 
many realities into the mix and may be less likely to achieve the “straightforward” gains. 
Allocation of technical resources during the start-up of a new technology is a challenge. 
 
Figure 8 presents a pie chart of the typical material costs to manufacture a glass-to-glass 
thin-film (TF) module with dual-lead interconnects, U-channel brackets for system 
mounting, and packaging for shipment. Costs to produce units with extruded aluminum 
frames as used to manufacture crystalline-type products are greater than the simple U-
bracket, on order of two times greater than the mounting bracket for the glass-to-glass 
configuration.38
 
 
Figure 8. Typical TF Direct Material Profile
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Total material costs for an 80-watt module are estimated at $0.85 per watt ($68/m2). The 
material composition of a finished TF module is displayed in Figure 8 by rank from 
highest to lowest percentage of cost. The direct material item, percentage and cost per m2 
are as follows: 
 
1. ~31% -- Heat Strengthen (HS) Front Glass (edge finish) and Frit buss ($21/m2), 
which is the substrate upon which the thin-film device is deposited; 
2. ~25% -- CTO plus TF material ($17/m2) that includes all thin-film materials from 
CTO layer to semiconductor to back contact and metal; 
3. ~21% -- HS-Rear Glass/EVA at ($14/m2) with edge seaming; 
4. ~8% -- Box (bulk packaging) & labeling at ($6/m2); 
5. ~7% -- Wire Assembly ($5/m2), comprised of J-box, pottant, wire leads with 
male/female connectors; 
6. ~7% -- Bracket/ Sealant ($5/m2), for mounting the module and sealing edges from 
moisture. 
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The requirement for HS-CTO and HS-Rear glass for Apollo imposed a cost on order of 
$4 - $5 per square meter (~$0.05/Wp). Both HS processes were additive to direct material 
costs for Apollo. The Frit/Temper process applied to CTO glass accounts for 75% of the 
total HS cost in Apollo, but was an essential process for “firing” the conductive frit buss 
collector in any event. If the frit buss system is eliminated, the HS costs could arguably 
be reduced. Other CdTe processes may achieve in situ heat strengthening of the TF 
product.  
 
The Apollo CTO, CdTe semiconductor material, back contact and metallization cost is 
about one-fourth of total material cost in the above configuration. Adding the HS-Front 
Glass substrate, the percentage is about 56%39. The remaining cost elements, which 
comprise 44% of the total material cost, are also requisite in the production of crystalline 
modules in many instances. The ability to achieve greater material cost savings by 
reducing only the thin-film semiconductor material costs is limited.  
 
Another way of looking at thin-film module costs is to recognize that their use in large 
power arrays imposes additional balance of systems (BOS) costs because the power 
density (Wp) per square meter is lower. In the case of the Apollo module, the power 
density is about 80W/m2 given the overall 24”x61” footprint. By contrast the size of a BP 
multi-crystalline 80W module is only 0.65m2, which is equivalent to approximately 
123W/m2. Hence, the multi-crystalline 80W module’s power density is about 50% 
greater than the Apollo module put into production at Fairfield. Since BOS costs are 
approximately linear with overall array footprint, the Apollo module cost would have to 
be reduced on order of 50% to offset greater BOS material and installation costs. There is 
little prospect to achieve such large cost reduction for thin-film modules generally. The 
answer still comes down to power rating and power density. Prototype Apollo array 
calculations concluded that a sizeable total cost/performance shortfall would persist 
relative to higher power density crystalline Si units. The lower power density of the 
Apollo module, even if its module costs were significantly lower, still must confront the 
area-related balance of system costs for an array. 
 
The discussion thus far only addresses thin-film direct material costs, which are typically 
much lower than crystalline Si direct materials due mainly to unit wafer/cell costs. 
Looking at post-lamination crystalline module assembly labor costs, there isn’t a great 
difference with thin-film module assembly efforts. Both types typically involve soldering 
wire leads to the interconnect buss, mounting a J-box, IV testing, installing an optional 
mounting system (e.g., frame), cleaning, labeling, and packing. The crystalline tabbing, 
lay-up, and lamination process were very labor intensive in comparison to thin-film laser, 
metallization, edge-deletion, and lamination steps. Several companies have come forward 
with automation for the processing of crystalline modules in these areas. There may still 
be significant cost advantages for thin-film deposition, as opposed to wafer sawing and 
coating, but needs to be proved out, as some operations of this type appear to be 
narrowing the labor cost gap. 
 
Generally speaking, the engineering, maintenance, and plant management costs would be 
quite similar for thin-film as for crystalline PV module manufacturing. Overall thin-film 
 49
modules can cost less than x-Si on a direct material basis. However, to the extent thin-
film units are to put into field arrays, the greater area required per system output target 
imposes substantial cost increases in BOS materials and possibly field installation labor 
as well. The Apollo module may have gained sufficient power density in time, but the 
possibility of commercial success was problematic pending success in the field. Full 
qualification of the Apollo product and manufacturing process was certainly years away. 
 
Thin-Film Technology and Manufacturing Ramp 
 
Manufacturing technology is different from R&D technology in one very important 
sense. While a handful of “superior” thin-film devices (or even a few hundred devices) 
may be produced in the laboratory, they are produced under very different circumstances. 
First, the equipment and materials used can be top grade, as cost savings on the order of 
pennies is not critical for a R&D demonstration. In any event, the quantities consumed in 
making the breakthrough devices will be modest. Second, the R&D laboratory staff will 
typically include highly trained and motivated individuals. Thirdly, the R&D timeline is 
such that compared to profitable factory operations, the rate at which the advanced 
devices are made is, in a word, “glacial.”  
 
The Apollo R&D team spent about 10 years developing the CdTe electrochemical 
process. The Fairfield engineering team was allotted 24 months in which to bring up a 
manufacturing line on a scale that was two orders of magnitude greater than the R&D 
device production rate. This relationship of R&D experimental time to targeted 
manufacturing start-up time has been observed in other companies as well.  
 
The quantity of material to be consumed in manufacturing takes on a whole new 
dimension. In Fairfield, chemical solutions were delivered in totes that could only be 
handled with a forklift. CTO glass came in truckloads and was fabricated on a float line 
flowing at rate of 20 to 30 feet per minute, or about 20 tons of glass per hour. 
Manufacturing processes had to be controlled on a 24/7 basis and, more importantly, a 
means of monitoring the thin-film process so as to detect out-of-control situations before 
a ton of material (about 120 substrates) had to be scrapped. Equipment maintenance and 
calibration needed to be “95/95” capable of uptime and in six-sigma control. The large 
quantities of direct materials and the law of large numbers will undoubtedly produce out 
of specification values never seen or considered by the R&D team.  Manufacturing 
engineers also have to develop a repertoire of “trouble-shooting” techniques to correct for 
unusual circumstances created by variations in materials, equipment, operators, and plant 
services. 
 
Perhaps a better way of drawing the distinction between R&D levels of expertise and that 
in manufacturing is to consider the cycle time per module. A 10-megawatt thin-film line, 
producing an 80-watt unit over a 50-week period, has to produce a finished, quality 
module every 4 minutes working on a 24/7 basis. This does not take yield into 
consideration, so the 10MW cycle time is typically much more compressed. And, by the 
way, cost and product mix targets must be met while accommodating engineering trials to 
test better methods or to develop new products. 
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High-volume manufacturing of a commodity (for Apollo watts installed in an electrical 
grid) is a very tough game. It took a long time to assemble the first-rate engineering 
Apollo team at Fairfield. Eventually, the team would have successfully brought Apollo 
manufacturing up to an acceptable level. However, business plans for thin-film 
technology often exhibit negative cash flow for many years. Once major spending begins, 
it is difficult to convince investors to patiently wait for a return.40
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End Notes 
 
                                                 
 
1 Original strategy proved infeasible because it assumed product attributes (manufacturing cost and 
efficiency) that were not achieved and also assumed power sales/financing terms and government 
concessions that were not successfully negotiated 
2 It was feasible to sell TF modules into markets where crystalline modules were the standard offering, but 
in traditional markets, TF prices had to be substantially below crystalline prices, and TF manufacturing 
costs were higher than originally targeted, resulting in negative cash flow. 
3 The initial strategy envisioned sales to a sister business unit developing, financing and operating central 
station PV power plants.  In this case, certain market requirements did not apply, including UL certification 
and 20 year module performance warranties.  This should not be taken to imply that the product would not 
have been safe in a large array context nor have lifetimes appropriate to the solar farm application, but 
rather that, for example, meeting standards appropriate to a 10 year warranty would have been acceptable.   
4 The report deliberately does not address the relative advantages and disadvantages of the TF1 
manufacturing process in relation to a-Si manufacturing processes being developed or used by other 
companies.  Analysis necessary to do so professionally and credibly was not within the scope of work 
authorized by NREL.  
5 The Chronar Corporation originally developed a batch plasma deposition process for making amorphous 
silicon substrates. After Chronar filed bankruptcy in 1990, the principal investor formed Advanced 
Photovoltaic Systems, Inc. (APS) and continued development of the a-Si deposition process at a Trenton 
NJ pilot plant.  APS eventually transferred the technology and equipment to a special purpose plant in 
Fairfield, CA in 1992 – 93 and operated it in limited production until bankruptcy again intervened.  Factory 
assets were eventually purchased by BP Solar. 
6 Process throughput is a measure of how many units are processed per unit of time.  It a major factor in 
determining actual plant capacity, which in turn affects fixed costs per unit.  
7 First of a kind factories experiencing start-up and production ramp delays can incur significant additional 
capital expenditures. 
8 Module cost per Watt allows a first order comparison.   Installed system costs depend on module 
efficiency as well as unit cost.  The effect varies according to mounting structure, wiring and costs that 
scale with area, weight, etc. 
9 For example, see M.S. Keshner and R. Arya, “Study of Potential Cost Reductions Resulting from Super-
Large-Scale Manufacturing of PV Modules, NREL Sub-contract Report NREL/SR-520-36846, October 
2004. 
10 There is, as yet, little federal support of longer-term, higher risk plug-and-play product innovation and 
enabling technology.  
11 It is reasonable to ask and important to answer whether the cost experience reported and discussed 
applies directly to thin-film generally or other factories specifically.  Of course it does not.  The reader may 
choose to assume the Millennia and Apollo experience was an artifact of idiosyncrasies of the specific 
manufacturing processes and business contexts and has no other applicability.  Or the reader may choose to 
infer general or specific lessons that apply in other cases based on his/her direct knowledge of the other 
cases.  
12 The initial commercialization strategy selected by the venture sponsors was very aggressive, resulting in 
considerable competitive advantage if successful, but also significant additional risk. 
13 See note i 
14 Initial plant cost estimates were based on aggressive assumptions regarding product efficiency, process 
speed, and total yield and were based on conceptual, not detailed engineering estimates.  These various 
factors were not completely independent.  Trade-offs became better understood based on pilot runs and on-
going process development.  The final choice, driven by the need to achieve targeted plant capacity, 
dictated additional chambers. 
15 At the time, manufacturers of coated glass did not aggressively respond to the nascent a-Si PV 
manufacturing industry (the validity of a large future market was not demonstrated) and may have priced 
their offerings accordingly.   
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16 The basis of the initial depreciation estimate is not available to the authors.  The re-estimate did not, to 
the authors' knowledge, reflect an assumption of extended start-up at low production as actually occurred. 
17 Intial cost estimates were completed by an R&D organization based on conceptual rather than 
preliminary or detailed engineering.  In a project context, considering the risks and unknowns, 
contingencies well in excess of  those typical at this stage of project development for lower risk projects 
would have been appropriate, e.g. >50%.  The choice between budgeting for the unknown and risking 
budget overruns is faced routinely in private and public sector undertakings: overruns and missed cost 
targets are by no means uncommon when pre-commercial technologies are involved. 
18 Project cost estimation theory and practice in other fields relies on the use of project and line item 
contingencies to account for the impact of changes needed to achieve a project's specification.  Those who 
seek funding for scale up steps in PV development and manufacturing are faced with the dilemma of 
including contingencies in their estimates and thus jeopardizing their prospects for funding, or not 
including them and thus jeopardizing the ability to achieve projected costs. 
19 The problem of high area related costs incurred in using Millennia in rooftop applications was addressed 
in two ways.  First, government commercialization grants were applied specifically to offer the modules at 
a discount that more than off-set the area related cost penalty.  Second, an innovative module framing, 
interconnect and mounting system was developed that resulted reduced area related and installation costs to 
a bare minimum.  This patented approach reduces crystalline residential rooftop system installed costs by 
10 to 15% and is an important spin-off of the Millennia effort. 
20 Edge connector development was conducted under serious time pressure from the customer and also as a 
relatively new R&D target that had not been addressed previously.  This context is not conducive to 
exploration of optimal solutions that involve significant technical risk.  Parenthetically, it is the authors’ 
view that government programs could effectively provide the context for exploration of higher risk and 
longer development cycle plug and play innovations, including radical innovations that would extend 
system modularity to the level of the DC module. 
21Even the initial limited quantities of "pillow effect" product experienced minimal breakage when installed 
and in subsequent service.  However, any reliability problems exceeding customer expectations (based on 
their experience with crystalline products) was considered excessive.  Framed Millennia met this standard, 
and so continued sale into these applications was judged to be prudent and acceptable.  However, BIPV 
applications of interest to numbers of potential customers, as well as other frameless laminate applications 
preferred by a number of existing customers, were restricted pending introduction of heat strengthened 
laminates.    
22 Estimates assumed tens of thousands of 0.8 m2 units per year.  Heat strengthening costs would be 
sensitive to production volume and glass area.  
23 Line yields for silicon solar cells in high volume production currently range from less than 90% to 95% 
according to presentations at the First International Symposium on Photovoltaic Mass Production.  See 
http://www.epia.org/08Events/SEMICON2005/SE05_PRES1_07.pdf 
24 D. Shugar, “Strategies for Mainstreaming Grid-Connected PV This Decade”, March 26, 2003, chart #11, 
http://www.nrel.gov/ncpv_prm/pdfs/33586100.pdf 
25 In retrospect, the factory is better viewed as the culmination of an RD&D process than as a self-justified 
commercial project.  It could be inferred that “good money was thrown after bad” in pressing forward with 
incremental innovation to solve problems and improve overall results.  The same could be said of much 
R&D conducted by US companies and laboratories.    
26 The Chronar Corporation originally developed a batch plasma deposition process for making amorphous 
silicon substrates. After Chronar filed bankruptcy in 1990, the principal investor formed Advanced 
Photovoltaic Systems, Inc. (APS) and continued development of the a-Si deposition process at a Trenton 
NJ pilot plant.  APS eventually transferred the technology and equipment to a special purpose plant in 
Fairfield, CA in 1992 - 93. 
27 There were several “Solarex patents” related to the product (recipe) and process used to produce a-Si 
photovoltaic modules. Solarex developed an inline process for producing a-Si photovoltaic modules, and 
eventually scaled up the process at the Toano VA plant. When BP acquired Amoco in 1998, BP Solar also 
acquired Solarex and the Amoco share of a joint venture with Enron in the Toano enterprise. The Enron 
interest was eventually sold to BP Solar as well. 
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28 The specification of special purpose equipment for the first time is always subject to implicit risks. The 
Apollo technology team addressed the “known risks” in various ways such as requiring versatility where 
possible; but “unknown risks” are difficult since they may reveal themselves only after a large number of 
trials. Tests to correctly identify and remediate the defect become more difficult as the volume of product is 
increased. Unfortunately, the Apollo technology yielded a number of experiential challenges after start-up. 
29 Whenever module efficiency (η) is used, it references aperture area efficiency. 
30 Final design and delivery of the seven deposition tank fixtures was postponed until midway through 
2000, following successful completion of the Apollo “efficiency stretch” and the “commercialization” stage 
gates over the April 1999 through June 2000 period. 
31 Some of the over budget costs of renovation are one time effects for the home plant. New plant 
construction would be bid with the Apollo requirements upfront and facility costs likely would be less for a 
mature technology. New technology startups, however, seldom have the luxury of securing a special 
purpose building from the ground up, so over budget modifications can be anticipated. 
32 This level of performance for Apollo was about the same as that of the a-Si product produced by Solarex 
at Toano VA on the TF1 line. 
33 In order to successfully process 24-by 61-inch substrates, the Apollo team worked in collaboration with 
LOF, the glass manufacturer, in order to obtain low resistance CTO lites at a reasonable cost. The low ohm 
CTO reduced voltage drop and allows for more uniform electrochemical deposition across the 24” width of 
the substrate. The low ohm TEC glass was priced at about  $15/m2 for quantities of 1 – 2 truckloads per 
month. For volumes double this rate, unit costs would be about 5% lower 
34 Source NREL/SR-520-32883 report 
35 The glass-to-glass thin-film module is constructed such that the front glass, with the CTO and CdTe film, 
is attached to the rear glass, with EVA in between. 
36 The CTO was delivered in temper condition, but the Apollo process resulted in a relaxing of the surface 
compression to a HS condition. 
37 Some advocated a “cradle to cradle” stewardship where the cadmium material in scrap would be 
processed and used in manufacturing new material for making Apollo solar modules. Such an arrangement 
was considered, but only as a long-term goal. 
38 The frame configuration cost was approximately 2.5x greater than the bracket configuration due to more 
metal extrusion, more costly wire assembly and 50% reduction in units per bulk package. 
39 The cost values are presented with no yield losses. Generally the yield losses are typically greater for the 
front-end processes, which often take the form of low power, mechanical and visual losses. The front-end 
yield loss would apply to the HS Front Glass/CTO-TF Device, which represents about 56% of total 
material. The yield for lamination and encapsulation is typically higher, but any yield losses at final IV are 
still costly since it involves the next largest material category – HS Rear Glass/EVA. 
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